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On a warm evening in mid-June 2013, men and women took to the streets of cities across 
Iran in response to the official results of the presidential election. Many of those present had 
been in the streets in 2009, during the unprecedented protests and subsequent violent crackdown 
following the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. But in 2013 there was no 
anger, no sense of disenfranchisement and no security forces present. 
 Celebratory cheering and singing filled the air as young people expressed mixed relief 
and joy at the election of Dr. Hassan Rouhani, the unexpected first-round victor in a race many 
believed would go to one of the five conservative candidates running. Despite the closely 
managed circumstances under which presidential elections take place in Iran, many expressed a 
sense of having won something back from the government. Iranians had taken to the polls as 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had asked, and in return their voices were heard.  
 The stark contrast between elections in 2009 and 2013 may seem anecdotal, but is a 
prime example of the back and forth Iran has endured in the constant struggle to build a 
democratic political system. First in Persia, then Iran, and currently the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
internal currents toward representative government have been obstructed by various challenges 
ranging from domestic power grabs to foreign intervention. Yet even with these seemingly 
constant barriers, the evolution of the Iranian political system since 1900 has moved the country 
closer and closer to democracy. This thesis will follow the evolution of the Iranian political 
system from 1900, immediately before the Constitutional Revolution, to the present day to show 
how the country arrived at the popular election of Hassan Rouhani and attempt to extrapolate 
from the current political system what lies ahead for the democratic process.  
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The case of Iran in the Middle East is unique, in that although it is often grouped together 
with neighboring Muslim states, the political evolution of the country is quite different. Along 
with being Persian rather than Arab, Persia was never part of the Ottoman Empire, was not 
colonized in the traditional sense and has a long standing tradition of central rule. Many of the 
problems faced by the other Middle Eastern states have been avoided or experienced quite 
differently for Iran. Although power was centralized in the 1920s by Reza Shah, Iranian borders 
have been relatively unchanged for centuries. Iran as we know it today has had a central 
government, with more or less the ability to govern, since the time of empires. Because of this 
precedent, Iran was able to avoid much of the turmoil and instability experienced in post-colonial 
states after the end of World War II and the end of the Ottoman Empire. As neighboring states 
struggled to create a cohesive identity encompassing numerous tribes, Iran was able to focus 
energy and resources elsewhere. 
Iran has seen numerous popular protests and uprisings since the early 1900s, which were 
led by charismatic individuals but bolstered by the strong support of an engaged populace. 
Michael Singh points out, “Indeed, although periods of upheaval tend to be remembered today as 
being driven by iconic leaders such as Mossadeq, in the 1950s, and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, in 1979, it is important not to forget how broad and long standing the popular 
movements behind them actually were.” 1 This is important to keep in mind when exploring 
recent political history, for although foreign forces have imposed their will upon the Iranian 
people, few historical Iranian leaders have gained fame domestically without garnering the 
support of the people. This is dissimilar from the broader Middle East, where those in power in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Singh. "Iranian Re-Revolution." Foreign Affairs, July 26, 2010. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66499/michael-singh/iranian-re-revolution. 
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fthe past century have traditionally been military strongmen rather than the academic Mossadegh 
or the religious Khomeini.  
What qualifies as democracy is difficult to determine due to the lack of consensus by the 
international community. The United Nations cites O. Engstrom and Goran Hayden’s two 
criteria, including inclusive suffrage and “institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level and there are 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.”2 The same report also 
quotes Larry Diamond’s maximalist definition, which includes civil liberties, effective 
governance and autonomy of the branches of government. The report does not, however, give an 
independent definition of democracy. The UN Charter does not contain the word “democracy” at 
all, though a 2008 report claims it is implied by the opening “We the peoples”.3 
Since John Locke first pioneered the concept of governance by consent,4 the practical 
application of democratic government has resulted in it becoming the only truly legitimate form 
of rule. Former monarchies have implemented constitutional systems providing representative 
rule, while other states have done away with any form of monarchy. With the rise of the United 
States and the Cold War came the idea that democracy could be spread, allowing outside forces 
to introduce “of the people, by the people, for the people” governance. The result has created an 
emphasis on regime change as a viable means to introduce democracy from the outside, rather 
than allowing it to develop over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 United Nations Economic and Social Counsel, "Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and 
public administration." Last modified Jan 5, 2006. 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf. 
3 United Nations, "Democracy and the United Nations." Last modified 2008. 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/Democracy_UN_2008.pdf. 
4 John Locke. Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764). 
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Today, democracy is largely defined from the outside, rather than internally. Without 
international recognition of democracy, countries are often unable to overcome preconceptions 
of authoritarianism. For Iran, the result of U.S.-led rejection of Islamic-based democracy has 
been the assertion that the clerical regime is entirely illegitimate, despite high voter participation 
and largely peaceful elections with the exception of the 2009 presidential election. To better 
facilitate the examination of the Iranian political evolution, the author does not assume theocracy 
and democracy to be mutually exclusive. For the purposes of this discussion, democracy will be 
defined as government by consent through popular elections deemed free and fair by the 
population, as well as the protection of human rights and rule of law.  
 
The Ongoing Struggle Toward Democracy 
The political history of Iran is littered with lost opportunities and hypothetical alternative 
timelines. As is the case with many countries’ paths to democracy, minor victories are often 
overshadowed by majors defeats as institutions and leaders rise and fall. Despite foreign 
interference, bureaucratic obstructionism and varying degrees of widespread oppression, 
progress is made slowly and at times silently. Iran has been on a trajectory towards full 
democracy for over a century, beginning with the Tobacco Revolts in the late 1800s. Iran has to 
make the transition towards democracy without outside interference to win domestic legitimacy, 
particularly in light of their experiences at the hands of the British, Russians and the United 
States. As James Dobbins and Alireza Nader pointed out in the aftermath of the 2009 Green 
Movement protests, “Iran has the key ingredients to help create a more democratic political 
system -- a young, educated, and politically active population with a large middle class that 
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wants to be part of the global community.”5 The potential of Iran for democratic evolution can 




































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James Dobbins and Alireza Nader. "Gate Crashing the Opposition." Foreign Affairs, August 22, 2012. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138046/james-dobbins-and-alireza-nader/gate-crashing-the-opposition. 
 	   6	  
	  
Part 1: Under the Peacock Throne 
 
 
 Monarchy in the area now known as Iran had a centuries-long history before its collapse 
in 1979. From the ancient rulers Cyrus and Alexander to the Sasanian Empire, through caliphates 
and dynastic families, history suggests that Persian monarchical tradition stretches as far back as 
2,500 BC in numerous fashions and with varying degrees of central control.  Persian empires 
conquered great swathes of territory, sustained global trade routes, and became great centers of 
learning and art over the course of centuries. Those empires that operated from or held what is 
today modern Iran were among the most influential in world history. 
 The period of time to be discussed in the following chapters could be described as the 
death throes of the Persian monarchy. Unable to adapt to a changing world order, the Qajar 
Dynasty, which held reign in Persia from 1749 to 1925, became stagnant and eventually so 
internally crippled that the pressure of foreign powers was too great to bear. From concessions 
granted to these powers to popular unrest caused by widespread poverty, the Qajars were unable 
to effectively lead their country into the modern era. While they were not the last to sit on the 
Peacock Throne, their lack of leadership sowed the seeds of unrest and subsequent mass protest 
that would eventually bring down the traditional monarchy. 
 By the time Reza Khan began the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1921, foreign domination was the 
established norm for Iran, widespread lack of education inhibited international competition and 
economic conditions left no middle class to speak of. Most citizens lived in poverty. Despite 
reforms undertaken by Reza, government could not stand up to the power of the British and the 
Soviet Union, a power that forced abdications, muted the power of the legislature, and further 
crippled the country economically by hoarding profits from the nation’s oil fields.  
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 As power passed to Mohammad Reza in the 1940s and the second half of the 20th 
century began, the inequality facing Iran and tension between the monarchy and the influential 
Shi’ite clergy created a broad coalition of opposition parties. By the late 1970s, despite a weak 
illusion of control, Mohammad Reza was confronted by a groundswell of unrest, carefully 
organized around the exiled Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Under the pressure of street 
demonstrations and countrywide protests, the shah left the country and monarchy in Iran came to 
an end, bringing the beginning of a new phase in Iran’s journey to democracy. 
 
Constitutional Revolution 
Nearing the end of their reign, the Qajar’s Persia in the late 19th century was 
characterized by economic struggle and large concessions given to Russian and British 
companies that left large parts of the economy under foreign control. The great powers did not 
colonize Persia in a traditional sense. Rather they opted to secure economic interests in a way 
that gave them substantial control of the country’s finances and territory. The Reuter Concession 
of 1872 sold most of Persia’s roads, mills, factories, telegraph services and resource extraction to 
Paul Reuter, an entrepreneur known for founding the Reuters news agency, for five years, with 
60 percent of net profits going to Reuter for 20 years.6 This particular concession was met with 
outrage not only in Persia, but also in Russia because Moscow believed it infringed on its 
interests in Persia. The Reuter Concession only stood for one year in face of widespread 
opposition, but it effectively rallied those factions against Qajar Shah’s accommodating policy 
towards outside powers. It did not, however, reverse the broader state policy that allowed such an 
accommodation to be reached in the first place. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Nikkie Keddie. Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92 (Frank Cass, 1966), 5 
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When Nasir al-Din Shah gave all tobacco rights to Major G. F. Talbot in 1890, the 
Russians began stoking frustration at the formation of a Tobacco Regie (or monopoly), which 
would require all tobacco be sold to a foreign-owned corporation. Russia, which stood to lose 
from the arrangement, began fomenting unrest by arguing against the concession and 
encouraging citizens to protest. What became the Tobacco Revolts were joined by bazaaris, the 
powerful merchant class, in 1891, and that year a fatwa, or religious edict, against the use of 
tobacco products resulted in widespread protests and boycotts. Even within the Qajar court, 
women participated in boycotts to voice their displeasure with the direction of state policy. As a 
result of the popular movement, the shah cancelled the concession in hopes of avoiding civil 
conflict. This move by the shah also showed that it was possible to influence government policy 
through protest.  
In 1905 that potential was capitalized upon again when protests against the rule and 
mismanagement of the country by Nasir al-Din Shah’s successor, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, began 
with bazaaris before becoming a widespread popular movement. What began as protests against 
new tariffs to repay loans held by Russia gained support when the shah’s agents entered a 
mosque to disrupt a gathering of activists. Capitalizing on the unrest caused by economic 
concessions and the experience of past large-scale protests, leaders were able to effectively 
pressure the shah to allow the creation of an elected parliament. The Majles, or Parliament, was 
to be the legislative arm of a constitutional monarchy, providing a democratic element to the 
Persian government for the first time.  
As in the Tobacco Protests, the effective leaders of these protests were the clergy, with 
members of the ulama, or clergy, advocating boycotts, writing letters and maintaining fervor 
through their platform at the mosque. This leadership by the clergy was a surprise to the British, 
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who had not expected the powerful clerical class to take a political stand with the masses. A 
British official working in Persia at the time reported, “One remarkable feature of this revolution 
here -- for it is surely worthy to be called a revolution -- is that the priesthood have found 
themselves on the side of progress and freedom. This, I should think, is almost unexampled in 
the world’s history.”7 
This union of clergy and activists would be repeated often in protests under the various 
shahs, and eventually a coalition much like those in the early 1900s would put an end to the 
monarchy. These early lessons on mobilization, effective use of propaganda and cooperation laid 
the groundwork for the continued use of protest as a tool to impact policy. 
 
Elections were held hastily after the shah capitulated, and October of 1905 saw the first 
Majles convene under the direction of Speaker Morteza Gholi Khan Hedayat. A leader of the 
Constitutional Movement and subsequent political party of the same name, Hedayat would go on 
to hold posts including prime minister and finance minister before his assassination in 1911. 
Among the first acts carried out by the Majles was to approve the writing of a constitution, which 
was written hastily so the ailing shah could approve it. 
In 1906, the Persian Constitution was put into place by royal proclamation. The 
document would be revised over coming years, but the initial iteration including fundamental 
laws to facilitate elections of the newly created Majlis. Among the articles were qualifications 
for holding office, manner of election and restrictions regarding who could vote. Women were 
not granted suffrage nor were those with “mischievous opinions” or criminal record, active 
military personnel and anyone under 25 years of age.8 Based on the Belgian Constitution, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Stephen Kinzer. All The Shah's Men, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2003),35. 
8 Foundation for Iranian Studies, "Iran's 1906 Constitution." http://fis-
iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution. 
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its system of parliamentary monarchy, the Persian Constitution was not largely inclusive. But for 
the first time the shah was put under the rule of law and representative government was born. 
In 1907, the Majles amended and expanded the scope of the constitution. Supplementary 
laws primarily discussed the rights of land-owners but, interestingly, featured several key 
religious laws. The first article named Islam as the official religion of the state, and following 
articles gave clerics the task of approving legislative acts. Equal rights, freedom of the press and 
“judicial tribunals” were also affirmed by the amendments.9 
 
With the death of Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1907 came new challenges for the newly 
constituted Persian government. Muhammed Ali Shah succeeded his father and quickly turned 
on the Majles, seeking to use internal disagreement to undermine the power of the institution. 
The British and the Russians quickly sided with the crown and sought to intimidate legislators 
and officials. Due to widespread public unrest, Muhammad Ali Shah detained members of his 
own cabinet and named successors in an attempt to head off tension. Despite this move, in 
February an assassination attempt increased the shah’s suspicion of opposition parties and 
organizations. 
In 1908, the shah ordered the bombing of the Majles building, setting off a civil war. 
Officials were arrested and the assembly was closed, while in outer regions militias were formed. 
In Rasht and Tabriz, government forces clashed with Constitutionalists, those who wanted to 
restore the new constitution. The British and Russians implored the shah to stabilize the country 
by reopening the Majles and affirming his dedication to the Constitution.10 Fighting raged as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid 
10 "Persian Civil War." Taranaki Herald, Vol LIV Issue 13748, Pg 5, Sept 10, 1908. 
http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a=d&d=TH19080910.2.25. 
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Constitutionalist forces pushed towards Tehran, eventually taking the capital and re-establishing 
constitutional government. 
 
Foreign Interference in Persia  
The next year, Muhammed Ali Shah was forced into exile by pro-constitution forces.  
The Majles voted into power his 11-year-old son, Ahmad, with a regent appointed to handle 
affairs. Under Ahmad the Majles was able to enact reforms to rebuild the country following 
massive unrest and civil conflict. Ahmad Shah was, however, largely ineffective due to age and 
the numerous pressures bearing down upon him. This situation allowed the British and Russians 
to continue their interferences without effective resistance. Although unable to entirely shut 
down the Majles,  by exacerbating tensions and bribing Parliamentarians the forces seeking to 
maintain sole control of Persian affairs were able to render the body ineffectual. In his book The 
Strangling of Persia, Morgan Shuster records his time serving in Persia during 1911 as the 
treasurer-general, a post he was appointed to by the Majles and forced out of by the Russians. In 
his account of his time in Persia, Shuster writes, 
 
The Constitutionalists of Modern Persia will not have lived, 
struggled, and in many instances, died entirely in vain, if the 
destruction of Persian sovereignty shall have sharpened somewhat 
the civilized world’s realization of the spirit of international 
brigandage which marked the welt-politik [italics added] of the year 
1911.11 
 
 Shuster’s account of the interplay between Russia, Great Britain and Persia shows a clear 
picture of blatant usurpation of authority by the Great Powers. Shuster’s task in Persia was to 
assist in organizing and managing the government budget. As his work revealed the extent to 
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which foreign powers were exploiting the Persian people and stripping away the power of the 
elected parliament, the more harshly he was questioned, intimidated and occasionally bribed by 
those powers in question.  
During his time in office, Shuster began advocating for the Persian government on the 
international stage. In late 1911, he published a letter in The Times of London, quoted below, that 
attacked Russian interference in Persian affairs and further confirmed previous statements to the 
same effect. In response, the Russian government issued an ultimatum to the Persian Parliament, 
which was accepted, and Shuster was forced out of office. 
 
As for the condition imposed upon Persia by the Russian 
ultimatum that Persia shall for the future appoint no foreigners to 
official posts without the consent of the Russian and British 
Governments (a condition modified later into a veto upon 
appointments), the demand put Persia in the position of either 
entering upon a war, which would be utterly disastrous to 





Islam and Democracy in Persia 
When Shuster published The Strangling of Persia in 1912, he coined the term “Muhammedan 
democracy,” linking Islam to politics in a way that had not yet been done in the West. Unlike 
Christianity, Islam and governance were functionally connected since Islam’s inception, with the 
Prophet Muhammad serving both as the religious and political leader for his followers. The rapid 
spread of Islam and the empire built around it necessitated effective leadership, resulting in an 
outline for a system of government being developed within the tenets of the faith. Methods of 
taxation, exemptions for recognized religious minorities and systems of trial and punishment 
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became part of the teachings of Islam and were tested through implementation by empires over 
centuries. The question of whether an Islamic government can be democratic is one of the great 
debates of our time given not only Iran, but the rise of Islamist political parties in post-Arab 
Spring countries, as well as Muslim countries like Turkey. 
 Part of the difficulty in imagining a fully representative Islamic democracy is the deeply 
ingrained vision of democracy as seen in the West. For many, separation of church and state is 
critical, particularly in the case of Islam, which is seen by many as an inherently intolerant faith. 
Conflation of extremism with authority and historical experience with outcome of religious 
practice has led many to consider Islam and democracy at odds with one another in a way more 
inherent than other faiths, such as Christianity. The central flaw in assuming Islam and 
democracy are incompatible is the apparent general belief that only Western-style secular 
democracy is valid. This absolutist approach, where a country either follows a Western model or 
does not achieve democracy, rules out cultural and historical experiences that may influence the 
development of government. Brian Handwerk, of National Geographic, explains this problem as 
such, 
Ultimately democracy could evolve a bit differently in different 
cultures...It doesn't have to be a replica of the democracy we have 
in the U.S. You can't compare what we've achieved here as a 
society over two centuries with an emerging democracy, where 
people are just trying to test the boundaries and find out what 
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World War I  
It was against this backdrop of foreign interference that the First World War began. At 
the time, the shah was largely at the mercy of the British and Russian governments, and the 
Majles had little more than the illusion of power. The state was a financial disaster, with little 
control over its own trade and territory due to concessions. Although formally neutral, Persia 
became a battleground as Ottoman forces clashed with Allied troops on Persian territory. 
Fighting, though occasionally lulled, never left Persia for the duration of the conflict, leading to 
protracted financial and political woes. 
Kamyar Ghaneabassari wrote, “During the war and immediately after, Persia was in 
chaos, both because of the war's effects and because there was no effective authority over the 
country.”14Financially, Persia relied on a British monthly payment of about £70,000 [$4.4 
million] and in 1919 received “a loan of £2,000,000 [$110 million] and the appointment of 
British officials as financial and military advisers,”15 according to Edgar Turlington. The British 
felt they had a right to exercise control over Persia due to the geopolitical, strategic, and 
economic importance of the country. Lord Nathaniel Curzon, who served in key British offices, 
explained,  
 
If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why 
Persia should not be left to herself and allowed to rot into 
picturesque decay, the answer is that her geographical position, the 
magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future safety of 
our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now -- just as it 
would have been impossible for us any time during the last fifty 
years -- to disinherit ourselves from what happens in Persia.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Kamyar Ghaneabassiri. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Persia, 1856-1921.” Iranian Studies , Vol. 35, No. 1/3 (Winter - 
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15 Edgar Turlington. "The Financial Independence of Persia." Foreign Affairs. July 1, 1928. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68906/edgar-turlington/the-financial-independence-of-persia. 
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 In 1917, Russia had been pulled from the war due to the Bolshevik Revolution, and as a 
result forfeited its position in Persia. Great Britain saw this as an opportunity to create a 
protectorate, much as it had in other Ottoman territories following the war. However, after the 
newly formed Soviet Union renounced all tsarist policies and claims to land in 1921, the British 
could not move forward with the plan without appearing outwardly imperialistic and antagonistic 
towards the Soviets.17 Soviet forces remained in the north and eventually attempted to march on 
Tehran, making the renunciation little more than a symbolic gesture, but the British abandoned 
the plan nonetheless. 
 The end of the Qajar Dynasty came in 1921.  Reza Khan, a military leader in the north, 
led the Persian Cossack Brigade into Tehran in February of that year, heading off a Soviet march 
on the capital, and successfully staged a coup d’état by naming himself commander and chief of 
the army as well as minister of war. His ally, Seyyed Zia'eddin Tabatabaee, became prime 
minister. As a military man, Reza relied on his harsh persona to win him support among the 
population and regain control of the country. M. Reza Ghods explains, 
 
During his rise to power, he succeeded in establishing internal 
stability in Iran. In addition to suppressing the revolts in Gilan, 
Khorasan, and Azerbaijan, in 1922 he suppressed a revolt of 
Kurdish tribesmen led by Simko. Simko was a Shakkak chief in 
Kurdistan who had terrorized Azeris, Assyrians, and Armenians in 
Western Azerbaijan ever since World War I.18  
 
Reza’s use of military force to put down revolts won him allies in the political classes, 
which had recognized the need for strong central authority to overcome the many problems 
plaguing the country. Reza proved deft at forming pragmatic alliances depending on his needs, 
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changing loyalties frequently until he assumed complete control of the country. In 1925, the 
Qajar Dynasty officially ended when Ahmad Shah was deposed at age 27 and Reza took the 
Peacock Throne and the name Pahlavi. 
 
The Pahlavi Dynasty 
The Persia inherited by the Pahlavi Dynasty suffered from numerous problems, including 
a lack of education, infrastructure and state revenue. Decades of foreign domination had left the 
government weak and ineffective, with little control outside of the capital. M Reza Ghods 
explains, “Russian and British troops occupied large stretches of the country, blithely violating 
Iran's sovereignty .... Autonomous governments and movements in the provinces came to fulfill 
the administrative functions that had once been Tehran's prerogative.”19 Despite these problems 
caused by the First World War, one advantage to modernization occurred. In 1936, Cecil 
Edwards observed, “It was the World War, of course, which started the [quest for 
modernization]. It put an end, in Persia at least, to that unquestioned authority of the West over 
the East which had lasted for two centuries.”20  
Coming from humble beginnings, Reza was harsh and calculating, but nonetheless strove 
to push his country forward. Among his greatest achievements was the building of the University 
of Tehran, the first university in the country. He built roads and the Trans-Iranian Railway, 
reformed education and increased the number of industrial plants in service. For the judiciary, 
Reza Shah and his intellectual allies established legal codes and regulations that rebuilt the 
republican elements brought into being during the Constitutional Revolution. Over the nearly 
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two decades he was in control, Reza Shah was able to bring his nation back from the brink of 
collapse and lay the foundation of a modern state.  
Not all of the enacted reforms were met with unanimous support, however, and today 
Reza’s legacy is fraught with what many feel were misdirected policies that may have laid the 
foundations of the Islamic Revolution. Reza Shah was the first ruler of Iran to equate 
Westernism with modernity in public policy. The education system he built was based on a 
Western model, and he challenged traditional religious dress and cultural norms in an attempt to 
make his citizens look and act more like Western contemporaries. He mandated Western dress, 
making it illegal to wear religious clothing like the veil outside of the home. This act, which put 
him in direct confrontation with religious leaders and much of the conservative population, was 
met with protests and boycotts. His successful efforts to force nomadic tribes to settle, although 
necessary for the development of an effective tax system and state administration, also come 
under fire for disrupting the traditional lifestyles of many. Despite reforms in education and 
public health, rural and urban poor populations remained underserved and in many cases would 
until the Islamic Revolution. 
In the realm of foreign affairs, Reza challenged the status quo by forcing the British to 
renegotiate the D’Arcy Agreement governing British control of Persian oil. The domestic 
problems facing Persia in the first decade of the 20th century were exacerbated when oil was 
discovered by William D’Arcy, a British millionaire who held the exploration rights for most 
Iranian territory. Despite searching for a number of years, it wasn’t until 1908, after having 
decided to end the venture after losing £50,000 [$5.9 million], that oil was discovered near 
Masjed Soleiman. In 1913, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company opened the world’s largest oil 
refinery at Abadan, an island on the Persian Gulf. Under the D’Arcy Concession of 1901, signed 
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prior to the discovery of oil, the Persian government received only 16 percent of the profits of the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC).21 In 1913, Winston Churchill negotiated the purchase of 
controlling interest in APOC by the British government as part of his modernization of the 
British navy. 
 The shift from coal power to oil made Persia strategically important as well as an 
economic interest of the British government, which would later become key in legitimizing 
British presence following the end of the First World War. In 1923, Churchill successfully 
lobbied on behalf of APOC to secure sole rights to oil in Persia, removing any competition in the 
market. 
The D’Arcy Concession stood for more than 30 years as Persia watched the revenue from 
the oil industry largely leave the country. Citing the age of the agreement as well as new 
developments ever increasing the potential revenue for APOC, Reza Shah in 1932 unilaterally 
canceled the concession, forcing the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, under de facto control of the 
British government, to renegotiate terms to maintain their monopoly. Officials notified the 
British “that the Persian government would only conclude a new agreement upon terms which 
safeguarded Persia's vital interests.”22  
Since the end of the First World War, the economic significance of oil had only 
increased. This made the lucrative oilfields a central concern for the British, due as well to the 
many faceted international importance of oil control. At the same time, the British saw that 
Persia itself was not equipped to take full advantage of the economic potential of their oil fields 
due to all refineries being under foreign control. This provided an incentive for both sides to 
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settle negotiations, as the British were losing considerable profits and the Persians were unable to 
tap into the oil industry without the use of the foreign-controlled refineries. A.C. Millspaugh, in 
Foreign Affairs, explained, 
At this juncture, an act which might throw the Persian oil fields 
open to international competition could hardly be viewed as less 
than disquieting. On the other hand, Persia has neither the capital, 
the technical resources, the distributing and marketing connections, 
the economic statesmanship, nor, let us hope, the courage, to 
conduct her petroleum industry as a nationalistic undertaking.23 
 
 After months of mounting tension, referral of the issue to the nascent League of Nations 
and the threat of military intervention by the British, an agreement was reached that limited the 
area under control of APOC, guaranteed an income of £750,000 [$87.5 million] to the Persian 
government and required the company to make payments in lieu of income tax. APOC also 
promised to build schools, roads, and hospitals, as well as recruit and train a higher number of 
Persian citizens to work in their refineries.24 
Despite this seeming win for sovereignty, the new terms had little impact on operations. 
Many of the building projects promised were not undertaken, and corruption remained rampant. 
Working conditions in Persian refineries were deplorable, fueling public discontent with the oil 
industry and support for nationalization. Often tasked with dangerous duties, workers were 
uneducated, paid low wages, and at times lived in roughly made crude lodgings. As one 
Petroleum Institute Director described it,  
Wages were 50 cents a day. There was no vacation pay, no sick leave, no 
disability compensation. The workers lived in a shanty town called 
Kaghazabad, or Paper City, without running water or electricity, ... In 
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winter the earth flooded and became a flat, perspiring lake. The mud in 
town was knee-deep, and ... when the rains subsided, clouds of nipping, 
small-winged flies rose from the stagnant water to fill the nostrils .... 
Summer was worse. ... The heat was torrid ... sticky and unrelenting - 
while the wind and sandstorms shipped off the desert hot as a blower. The 
dwellings of Kaghazabad, cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat, 
turned into sweltering ovens. ... In every crevice hung the foul, sulfurous 
stench of burning oil .... in Kaghazad there was nothing - not a tea shop, 
not a bath, not a single tree. The tiled reflecting pool and shaded central 
square that were part of every Iranian town ... were missing here. The 
unpaved alleyways were emporiums for rats . 25 
 
Around this time, the shah was cultivating close relations with Germany. Historically, 
Persia had seen Germany as a viable ally due to their shared history of animosity with the British 
and Russians.  By 1939, Germany was the country’s largest trade partner, accounting for over 50 
percent of all trade.26 Germany also provided assistance in a variety of areas, sending experts and 
resources to the shah’s government to further modernization efforts. While the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain were seen as exploitative and solely chasing national interests, the relationship with 
Germany was reciprocal, providing the shah with needed goods and allowing him to pursue 
projects like building schools and infrastructure. 
  
World War II 
Germany also played a role in one of Reza Shah’s major diplomatic accomplishments. 
Although the international community had been referring to the country as Persia for centuries 
due to writings by the Greeks, domestically it had been referred to as Iran for centuries. In 1935, 
Reza Shah asked that the country be referred to as Iran in all diplomatic correspondence, 
effectively reclaiming his nation from external identification in hopes of building his nation’s 
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image in a more nationalist light. Hooman Majd notes that “by the beginning of the modern age 
of the twentieth century, Iran was still an independent nation-state, but “Persia”, as it was known 
outside of Iran, was denoted a weak and backward country then, one ripe for exploitation.”27  
 The significance of this change in regards to relations with Germany relates to the Aryan 
roots of Iran, which itself means “Land of the Aryans” in Persian. Germany cemented relations 
with Iran by emphasizing the Aryan connection, which put Iranians in a place of importance in 
the guiding ideology of the National Socialist Party. Although the shah was never formally 
aligned with Nazism, this place of prominence reflected well through Iranian nationalism, and 
made Germany a more favorable ally than the consistently oppressive British or Soviet 
governments.  
 At first, the British and Soviets did not consider the German-Iranian relationship a threat 
to their own interests. Operations inside the country continued as they had, and many of the 
modernizations carried out by Reza Shah, such as roads and railways, benefited foreign 
companies as well as Iranians. When World War II arrived, Iran once again declared neutrality, 
and this declaration was respected by and large until 1941. As Germany invaded the Soviet 
Union, the British saw a looming danger in the large number of Germans in Iran and the 
closeness of the German and Iranian leadership. Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union, the British 
oil interest, and the safety of the British position in Central Asia made the country of significant 
importance to the Allied forces and made the once seemingly benign German presence a 
potentially catastrophic problem. 
 Great Britain first responded to the situation by calling on the Iranian government to 
expel all German nationals from the country, although it was never considered likely that the 
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Iranians would do so. This call, however, served to legitimize the course soon followed. After 
weighing the options of the government, the British and Soviets agreed to work together on 
military action to secure vital interests and supply routes in Iran. “In the early morning of 25 
August British and Soviet forces from the South and the North of Iran respectively entered the 
country.”28 
 Iran had prepared for the potential of invasion by Allied forces by building up military 
presence in the north and at oil refineries, as well as diplomatically by pledging to respond to any 
invasion by entering the war on the side of Germany. Iranian efforts, however, were quickly 
thwarted once the Anglo-Soviet invasion began, and a ceasefire was called by Reza Shah within 
48 hours. F. Eshraghi summarizes, 
 
The suddenness of the occupation, the poor preparations of the 
Iranian forces, and the unrestrained Soviet bombing of various 
Iranian cities in Azerbaijan and Gilan caused utter confusion, fear, 
and even desertion among Iranian officers. The Iranian forces in 
the path of the British advance to Kermanshah were caught 
unawares while asleep in their barracks, but those defending 
Abadan, under the command of General Mohammad Shahbakhti, 







Allied Occupation of Iran 
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 The British and Soviet governments also had plans for Reza Shah. One month after the 
invasion, he was forced to abdicate and allow his 21-year-old son, Mohammad Reza, to succeed 
him. After some deliberation on who should succeed Reza, his son was decided upon for a few 
particular reasons. F. Eshraghi noted in 1984, “He had been warned by the fate of his father; 
constitutional procedures would not allow him freedom to intrigue; and his youth and 
inexperience would place him under the influence of the Cabinet.”30 For these reasons and the 
military inadequacy of Iran, the new shah was unable to resist Soviet and British demands or 
influence during the occupation. 
 If the development of Iran between the wars had any impact on the Great Powers, it was 
to their advantage. Where in World War I there existed a largely decentralized country with little 
infrastructure, World War II found a united, more easily traversed Iran. Railways and highways 
made communication and movement of goods and people all the more simple for the Allied 
forces, while the government in Tehran was unable to offer viable, organized resistance to the 
invasion and occupation.  
 One of the largest impacts on Iranian society during the occupation was the devaluation 
of the rial, which occurred due in part to the large volume of currency being bought by the 
occupying forces. Kamran Dadkhah explains,“The amount of notes in circulation which at the 
beginning of … 1941 was 1.2 billion rials rose to 1.7 billion rials on 19 March 1942, a rise of 
42.9 percent. This trend accelerated in the coming years. The amount of notes in circulation rose 
to 3.7, 6.0 and 6.6 billion rials at the beginning of each successive Iranian year.”31 Due to a 
favorable exchange rate to the Allied powers, Iranians suffered the devaluation heavily, while the 
British and Soviet forces saw little of the impact.  
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 The occupation by Allied forces lasted the duration of the war. The Persian Corridor was 
the primary route for aid to be delivered to the Soviet Union, and played a key role in supporting 
the Eastern front in the European theatre. In 1943, the Tehran Conference was held between the 
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the first such meeting of the allied powers. In 
1942 American troops had joined British and Soviet forces in occupying Iran. That same year, 
the Allied powers vowed to leave Iran within six months of the end of the war and to respect the 
sovereignty of the Iranian government. At the conference, the three affirmed their dedication to 
an independent Iran after the completion of the war. 
 This, of course, was not the first time such a promise was made, and was not the first 
time the promise would be broken. 
  President Franklin D. Roosevelt felt Iran could serve as an “experiment” in how to handle 
relations with client states, and as such sought to limit the role of the British and Soviets 
following the end of the war. Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger explain, “Iran, because of its 
situation, its problems, and its friendly feeling toward the United States, is (or can be made) 
something in the nature of a clinic ... an experiment station ... for the President's post-war 
policies ... his aim to develop and stabilize backward areas.” 32 Although the US emphasized the 
independence and sovereignty of Iran in rhetoric, in reality they saw the country as an 
opportunity just as the Russians and the British had before them. Iran was a state that could be 
influenced depending on the interests of the states wielding control, and in the post-World War II 
world, no country’s star was rising faster than the United States. 
 In 1945, the Soviet Union remained a key player in domestic events in northern Iran, 
their traditional sphere of influence. That year, the Azerbaijan Crisis erupted when the Soviet- 
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backed communist Tudeh Party took control of the autonomous republic’s government. At the 
same time, a Kurdish republic was declared at Mashad with Soviet support. What followed was a 
heated diplomatic campaign by the United States to discourage Soviet actions in the north and 
Soviet attempts to maintain some control over the country following the war. Soviet forces 
remained in Iran following the March 2, 1946, deadline for troop withdrawal. The United States 
responded by making clear that a military response was on the table, should Soviet linger any 
longer. By March 24, the Soviet Union removed its troops . 
 Despite the removal of troops, a legacy of the Soviet presence remained. The communist 
regime in Azerbaijan maintained control in the region, and concessions gave the U.S.S.R. 
controlling interest in a proposed oil company in the north. The United States provided Iran with 
assurances and affirmation of its right to reclaim Azerbaijan and to reject the oil treaty with the 
Soviet Union. In 1947, the Majles refused to ratify the oil agreement, and with the retaking of 
Azerbaijan the Soviet presence was expelled.33 
 One of the lasting legacies of World War II was the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah. Put 
into power by the British through a forced abdication by his father, the monarch relied on the 
authority and resources of outside forces to solidify his power. This can be seen in 1953 with 
Operation Ajax, which ousted popularly elected Prime Minister Mossadegh and will be 
discussed in detail shortly. Mohammad Reza favored the United States over the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, banning the communist Tudeh Party and encouraging Western 
modernization and secularization. Despite reforms undertaken by his regime, the shah was never 
able to overcome the perception of his reign serving foreign forces rather than domestic interests. 
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This widespread impression would be an important factor in the 1979 Islamic Revolution that 
unseated him. 
It should come as no surprise that World War II played out very much like World War I 
for Iran, with foreign occupation and usurpation of authority violating declared neutrality. 
Although Reza Shah initially put up an organized resistance, something the Qajar Dynasty had 
not been able to do, he was quickly swept from power in favor of a younger, less experienced 
ruler who would not cause trouble for Allied interests. Economic and strategic interests, be they 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or the Persian Corridor for supplying Soviet forces, provided 
rationale for the occupation of Iran just as they had during World War I.  
Following the end of World War II, life in Iran continued by and large as it had under 
Reza Shah. The young, new monarch had been educated in the West, returning to Iran to attend a 
military academy. His exorbitant spending would win him few friends in Iran, as he and his wife 
hosted lavish parties and enjoyed finery while the people of Iran struggled to make ends meet. 
Despite progress made in areas of public interest, education, wealth and access to medical care 
remained in the hands of very few, as services would until the Islamic Revolution. 
 
Mohammed Mossadegh and Operation Ajax 
 In 1951, Iranians elected the National Front to a majority of seats in the Majles, meaning 
the naming of a new prime minister from the ranks of career parliamentarians. Mohammed 
Mossadegh was an eccentric man as well known for his speeches as for his often theatrical 
personality, which included public displays of melancholy. Well educated and charismatic, 
Mossadegh was a larger-than-life character in a political landscape that had very few stand out 
leaders. He made his career in the Majles, where he fought for Iranian, rather than foreign, 
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interests. At this time, the Majles was largely toothless, able to push through some reforms but 
obstructed often by the foreign powers when their interests seemed to be at stake. 
 Mossadegh, however, brought to the legislature a fiery populism that reinvigorated those 
who hoped to rebuild Iran outside the shadow of foreign domination. His time in office saw a 
resurgence in the strength of the Majles, giving Iranian’s a functional representative government 
for the first time. Stephen Kinzer explains, 
 
During Mossadegh’s twenty-seven months in office, the promise 
of the Constitutional Revolution finally became real. Power was 
held by elected officials. Parliament addressed people’s needs. The 
grasping shah had been pushed into the background. Iranians 
enjoyed more freedom than ever in their history.34  
 
 In 1953, the British government approached the newly inaugurated President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower with a request for help. The Iranian prime minister was calling for the 
nationalization of oil, threatening the highly lucrative Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It was the 
wish of the British government that the United States assist in toppling Mossadegh, a plan that 
had been discussed and rejected by President Harry Truman a year before. Truman, who visited 
Mossadegh in an attempt to negotiate an agreement between the parties, felt it unnecessary for 
the United States to protect British interests by so blatantly violating Iranian sovereignty. To win 
over Eisenhower, the British government relied on his desire to counter Communism and 
exaggerated Mossadegh’s politics to suggest he may ally Tehran with the Kremlin. Unwilling to 
allow the vast oil reserves of Iran fall under Soviet control, Eisenhower gave the Central 
Intelligence Agency the green light on Operation Ajax. 
 The CIA’s new director, Allen Dulles, enlisted Kermit Roosevelt in planning and 
implementing a plan that would become the first CIA covertly engineered coup.  From the 
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basement of a CIA safe house Roosevelt and a small team of CIA officers recruited mobs to 
protest Mossadegh’s policies, creating the illusion of political instability and polarization. Within 
weeks violent clashes in the streets and the outcry from bribed officials resulted in the loss of 
public confidence in the National Front and Mossadegh.  
The shah fled the country on August 15, when it appeared the coup would fail after 
Mossadegh challenged a royal decree calling for him to step down. Mohammad Reza fled the 
country, first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Four days later, mass demonstrations by bought 
crowds wiped Tehran into a frenzy. Clashes resulted in deaths as Tehranis opposed what was 
framed as a communist revolution. Mossadegh, after fleeing his shelled home, turned himself 
into the army rather than rally supporters. Military commander Fazlollah Zahedi, the face of the 
anti-Mossadegh leadership, was named by royal decree to replace Mossadegh. When the shah 
returned and Mossadegh was put under house arrest, the country’s window of democracy closed 
tightly. 
  
Iran After Mossadegh 
The coup cast a long shadow over U.S.-Iran relations. Before the events of 1953 Iran had seen 
the United States as an ally, particularly given the American history of fighting for independence 
against the British. But when it came to light that the CIA was responsible for the overthrow of 
Iranian democracy, the United States became no better than the Soviet and British in the minds 
of many Iranians. Today, in Iran, the memory of 1953 mars U.S. rhetoric favoring democracy 
and any espoused good intentions towards Iran, as demonstrated by public statements by 
Ayatollah Khamenei, such as: 
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It is interesting to realize that America overthrew his government 
even though Mosaddeq had shown no animosity toward them. He 
had stood up to the British and trusted the Americans. He had 
hoped that the Americans would help him; he had friendly 
relations with them, he expressed an interest in them, perhaps he 
[even] expressed humility toward them. And [still] the Americans 
[overthrew] such a government. It was not as if the government in 
power in Tehran had been anti-American. No, it had been friendly 
toward them. But the interests of Arrogance [a term Khamenei 
often uses to symbolize the United States] required that the 
Americans ally with the British. They gathered money and brought 
it here and did their job. Then, when they brought their coup into 
fruition and had returned the shah, who had fled, they had the run 
of the country.35 
 
 Upon returning to Iran, Mohammad Reza quickly consolidated power and stripped the 
Majles of any remnants of power. Opposition parties were broken up and leaders were exiled or 
arrested, while protests were violently put to an end. Elections, while not suspended, were little 
more than a show to keep international backers happy, including the United States. A 
Parliamentarian described it as such: “The present system by which elections were cooked and 
politicians were forcibly enrolled into fake parties, was worse than a sham; it was corrupting and 
degrading the whole standard of public life and filling every Iranian who had any concern for the 
healthy evolution of his country with black despair.”36 
 
 The 1953 overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh is often regarded as a turning point in 
Iranian history and a lost opportunity. A large “what if” stands over the narrative surrounding the 
coup. What if Mossadegh had been able to pursue a more rigorous democracy in Iran? What 
would today look like? Would the Islamic Revolution ever have happened? Instead, that pivotal 
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moment is when oppression and dictatorship came to Iran, destroying what little political 
progress had been made and laying the groundwork for massive protests that would bring about 
the end of the monarchy 25 years later. “Pahlavi absolutism suffocated the natural development 
of democracy. This produced the explosion that led to Iran’s present conundrum,”37 explains 
Stephen Kinzer. 
 
The Rise of Ayatollah Khomeini 
 The 25 years of the shah’s reign following the overthrow of Mossadegh proved to be the 
end of Iranian monarchy. Many Iranians quickly became disillusioned with the United States, 
once thought of as an ally, after evidence pointed to CIA responsibility for the coup. Mohammad 
Reza, however, leaned heavily on his Western backers, creating an economic drain on the 
country as he purchased weaponry from the United States. Given proximity to the Soviet Union, 
Iran became a bulwark against Communism in the Middle East, and the United States sought to 
bolster Iranian military capability to maintain containment. 
 In 1962, Mohammad Reza introduced a land reform plan referred to as the “White 
Revolution.” Tacked on to the plan were education and welfare initiatives, as well as 
privatization of industry and nationalization of parks. Among those opposed to the plan was the 
clerical establishment, which felt its influence was threatened in traditionally religious areas such 
as education. Although the plan was marketed as a step towards modernization, it also served the 
purpose of reinforcing traditional power structures and solidifying the shah’s central authority. 
Mohammad Reza sought to use land redistribution, curbing the power of landlords and increased 
state aid to win more support among the lower socioeconomic classes of the country, a segment 
of the society traditionally aligned with the clergy. 
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 It was in the wake of this schism with the Shi’a clergy that a clerical leader was able to 
make his name. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was already in his early 60s when the death of 
prominent leaders in the clergy gave him the opportunity to take his political teachings to a 
national level. Speaking out against the shah’s land reforms, Westernization and the meddling of 
the United States soon made the charismatic writer and lecturer a leader of the religious 
establishment. In 1964, Khomeini was exiled first to Turkey, then to Iraq and later to Paris, from 
where he was able to continue building and empowering a religiously led movement that 
eventually resulted in the toppling of the Pahlavi Dynasty. 
 Born in 1902, Ruhollah Khomeini’s driving ideology was formed through Islamic 
teachings as well as Greek philosophy, particularly the works of Aristotle and Plato. As explored 
in his later works, Khomeini considered governance and Islam inextricably linked. He felt the 
ulema – the Islamic clergy -- had an obligation to use its leadership position in society to address 
political issues and as such wove political rhetoric into his sermons and teachings. When the 
shah targeted clerical influence, he gave Khomeini the perfect platform to attack Westernization 
policies and the shah’s own secular approach to policy. 
 Anti-Westernization had become a common theme in intellectual circles, spanning 
political barriers. Iranian writers and intellectuals like Ali Shari’ati and Jamal Al-e Ahmad had 
begun seeking ways to modernize Iran without turning to “Westoxication,” as they called 
Western influence. These writers saw the power of the clerical establishment, calling it a 
“government within a government.” For Shari’ati and Al-e Ahmad, both allies of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Islam was part of the authentic Iranian culture they sought a return to and which was 
necessary as a basis of legitimacy for revolutionary ideology. For these writers and their 
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contemporaries, Islam and progress were not opposing forces, a theme that continues in Iranian 
rhetoric today.  
 Many of the themes explored by Shari’ati and Al-e Ahmad would appear in “Rule of the 
Jurisprudent,” in which Ayatollah Khomeini outlined his case for the importance and function of 
an Islamic political system led by the clerical class. Khomeini cited foreign intervention and 
cultural obstruction as threats to the traditional Islamic nature of the Middle East and called for a 
government ensuring the preservation of religious tradition. The book outlined a system of 
government that includes both representative elements and religious guidance, the manifestation 
of which is the Islamic Republic.  
 During his exile, Ayatollah Khomeini was able to maintain influence within Iran through 
cassettes and statements smuggled into the country and played by his clerical allies. First in 
Najaf, the Shi’ite holy city in Iraq, and later from the suburbs of Paris, Khomeini recorded tapes 
calling on the citizenry to rise up against the shah. The tapes were disseminated through a 
network of clerics based in Qom and played in mosques across Iran. These tapes complemented 
internal efforts to organize resistance to the shah, mobilizing not only urban populations but 
villages as well,38 while also allowing Khomeini to remain the leader of a growing movement 
against monarchical rule. Having relocated to Paris in 1978, Khomeini was able to expand his 
opposition activities considerably. Amir Taheri explained the advantages Khomeini found on 
French soil, including access to media. Khomeini was visited by thousands of supporters, 
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The shah’s Iran in 1979 
 Domestically, by the mid-1970s the shah’s Iran had become a human rights nightmare. In 
1975, Amnesty International declared “no country in the world has a worse human rights record 
than Iran.” Secret police called SAVAK terrorized opposition parties and those who spoke out 
against the shah. Individuals were arrested, tortured, killed and “disappeared.” Amnesty 
International estimated that the number of political prisoners held in 1975 was between 25,000 
and 100,000.40 While the United States and other Western states heralded the modernity of Iran 
and attended lavish galas held by the royal family, the average citizen struggled to attain 
education, medical care and a livable wage.  
Under the shah, access to higher education was divided along class lines, with the 
wealthy testing into universities while low-income students were often unable to afford the 
preparatory tools necessary for many to succeed. A mere 3 percent of the population received 
any college education in 1971, with expected years of schooling reaching eight in 1980.41 In 
1978, women made up one third of the university population.42 In 1976, 35 percent of women 
were literate, with large disparities between rural and urban populations. 
 In 1977, the deaths of Ali Shariati and the son of Ayatollah Khomeini were widely 
believed to be assassinations carried out by the shah’s agents. Unrest grew until 1978, when 
religious protestors were fired upon by government forces in what would become known as 
Black Friday. As late as that year the United States intelligence community saw no credible 
threat to the shah’s hold on power, but with Black Friday those who had sought to topple the 
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monarchy had their chance. Unrest across political parties and religious barriers had allowed a 
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Part 2: The Islamic Republic 
 
Spurred by Khomeini’s taped rhetoric and his supporters in Iran,  popular unrest came to 
a head in October 1977 as street demonstrations began against the shah. At the outset of 
demonstrations against the Peacock Throne, the movement was supported by a broad segment of 
the population. Stanford University’s Abbas Milani explains, “Almost 11% of the population 
participated in it, compared to the estimated proportionate of citizens who took part in the French 
(7%) and Russian (9%) revolutions.”43 While the primary actors in organizing the revolution 
were Islamic and Marxist to varying degrees, non-ideological portions of society joined the 
movement out of desire to see the shah ousted.44 The shah’s economic policies had alienated the 
influential bazaari and merchant classes, as well as farmers. Students rallied behind the 
movement, drawing inspiration from the works of Ali Shar’iati and other anti-Western leftist 
thinkers.45 The rhetoric of the revolution focused on democracy and freedom, a message that 
resonated across religious and political lines. JS Ismael explained the leadership role of the 
clergy in 1980. 
 
The clergy ... assumed prominence because the secularist forces 
were in a state of disarray caused by the continuous pressure which 
the Shah and SAVAK inflicted upon these groups. The leaders of 
these groups were either in jail, exile, or dead.46 
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Over the course of the next year, strikes and protests brought the country to a standstill as 
political parties and opposition leaders came together to stand against the shah’s rule. The 
groundswell brought together unlikely bedfellows, forming alliances that would shatter 
following the fall of the shah. Despite later violence, Khomeini discouraged his followers from 
using force to achieve the overthrow of the shah. The result was a victory for non-violent protest, 
as “except for a series of short battles using light weaponry in the final hours of the uprising,” the 
protestors heeded Khomeini’s request.47 According to Eric Rouleau, 
 
Disregarding many of his advisers, he insisted that the battle be 
waged without recourse to arms, and never tired of repeating that 
the Shi'ite faith would prevail over brute force. His calculation 
proved well founded: a year later, the imperial army -- the most 
powerful in the Middle East after that of Israel --succumbed to 
"bare-handed revolutionaries".48  
 
 The shah ordered the violent breakup of demonstrations, further driving the public’s fury. 
In January 1979, the shah fled the country, taking refuge in the United States for cancer 
treatment. Ayatollah Khomeini returned from Paris, greeted by throngs of supporters and 
oversaw the creation of an interim government. Meanwhile those with ties to the shah’s 
government fled the country if possible, while others remained to endure the post-revolution 
turmoil to come. 
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Rule of the Jurisprudent and the Islamic Iranian Constitution 
The guiding force of the formation of the Islamic government was valayet y-feqih, or rule 
of the jurisprudent. The constitution of Iran, rewritten after the revolution, codifies the rule of the 
jurisprudent into a complex hierarchical bureaucracy that in practice creates overlap between 
offices. The constitution itself marries religious and republican language when discussing the 
rights of the people and responsibilities of the state. The document contains 175 clauses, 
empowering the state to maintain religious identity and unity while also recognizing the role of 
the citizen in government. Although the core basis for the document is religious precedent, 
drafters looked beyond Islamic fundamentalism to incorporate contemporary practices. Ervand 
Abrahamian explains, 
 
A closer look … shows that the text of the constitution, not to mention its 
pretext, subtext, and context, is highly nonfundamentalist. Its central 
structure was taken straight from the French Fifth Republic, with 
Montesquieu's separation of powers. It divides the government into the 
executive, headed by the president, supervising a highly centralized state; 
the judiciary, with powers to appoint district judges and review their 
verdicts; and the national Parliament, elected through universal adult 
suffrage. For years Khomeini had argued that women's suffrage was un-
Islamic. He now argued that to deprive women of the vote was un-
Islamic.49 
 
At the top of the governmental hierarchy is the Supreme Leader, the final arbiter of issues 
in the country. The Supreme Leader is responsible for ensuring the direction the country follows 
comports with Islam and personally oversees all foreign policy issues. To hold the position, a 
candidate must be a grand ayatollah and accepted as a descendant of the prophet Mohammad (a 
sayyid, as signified by the black turban). The office has only been held by two men since 1979, 
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Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei, making it difficult to discern additional qualifications. 
The Assembly of Experts appoints and can impeach the Supreme Leader. 
 The Assembly of Experts is the second most important office in the government due to its 
oversight of the Supreme Leader. The assembly is responsible for the election of and potentially 
removal of the Supreme Leader, a duty never seen in practice. The body ranges in size between 
80 and 90 members, all elected by direct public vote every eight years. Abrahamian explains 
another facet of the Assembly’s power as such, 
 
The constitution added that if no supreme religious judge emerged 
after Khomeini, the leadership would pass to a committee of three 
or five senior clerics (marajec-e taqlid) to be chosen by the 
popularly elected Assembly of Experts. Najafabadi, the author of 
the controversial Shahid-e Javid, argued in a new book entitled 
Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Salihan (Jurist's guardianship: 
Worthy government) that this two-stage electoral process would 
help harmonize the concepts of divine rule and clerical supervision 
with those of popular sovereignty and majority representation. He 
also argued that the concept of velayat-e faqih implicitly involved 
the notion of a "social contract" between the religious judges and 
the population.50 
 
The Guardian Council is a 12-seat body composed of six experts on Islamic law and six 
experts on constitutional law. Positions are filled through appointment, both directly through the 
Supreme Leader and through nomination by the judiciary and voting by the Majles. The council 
is responsible for the vetting of candidates for elected offices, overseeing elections, and 
interpreting the Constitution. The domestic influence yielded by the Guardian Council is 
considerable not only due to the oversight provided on all stages of the election process, but also 
the ability to challenge laws and policies. All laws passed by the Majles must be approved by the 
Guardian Council, with the bill returning to the Majles for revision in the event it does not pass. 
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If disagreement persists between the Majles and the Guardian Council, the dispute is resolved by 
the Expediency Discernment Council. 
The Expediency Council is responsible for resolving disagreements between branches of 
government and for advising the Supreme Leader. All positions on the council are appointed by 
the Supreme Leader himself, and the body was given oversight of most government functions in 
2005. The current chairman, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has served for three five-year 
terms in the leadership role. Most seats are held by current or former high level officials, 
including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former Revolutionary Guard commander Mohsen Rezaee. 
Appointments can be used by the Supreme Leader to reward or punish public figures, although 
members fall along the entire political spectrum. 
Despite the shared title of president, the Iranian executive office does not hold the same 
authority as the U.S. equivalent. The Iranian president is the international face of his country, but 
his power is checked by the Supreme Leader on foreign issues and the Majles on domestic 
policy. The degree to which control is exerted over the president fluctuates depending on several 
factors, including the current domestic situation in Iran and the level of favor enjoyed by the 
president. The cases of Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad demonstrate the varying amount of 
power presidents are given. Khatami, although unable to effect sweeping change, was able to 
explore dialogue opportunities with the West and relax some restrictions on public life. 
Ahmadinejad was initially an outspoken international figure, but found few allies in the 
Parliament. As his second term got underway, the Supreme Leader pulled away from 
Ahmadinejad, the result of which can be seen in his decreased international profile in the last 
years of his presidency.  
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The Majles, or Islamic Consultative Assembly, is the legislative branch of the 
government. It passes domestic laws and acts much as a parliament does in the West. Candidates 
are vetted by the Guardian Council and elected by direct voting by the public. The Majles has 
direct checks on the power of the presidency, including budget approval and the ability to ask 
questions of the administration that require answers. The body also votes on cabinet post 
nominations put forth by the president, with the ability to reject them through votes of no 
confidence. But the United States Institute of Peace explains,  “the 290-member parliament is 
weak compared with the presidency, as well as with the non-elected institutions such as the 12-
member Guardian Council” due to high turnover.51 Seats are reserved for religious minorities, 
and the speakership is voted on each year by the members. 
 Article 6 lays out the principle of relying upon public opinion to inform the affairs of the 
nation. Public elections of a number of offices, including president and representatives to the 
Majles, are the means by which the masses interact with the government. These representative 
bodies are in some cases mirrored by similar appointed offices with clerical leadership, such as 
the elected Majles and the appointed Guardian Council of the Constitution. In some ways, this 
governmental duality can be seen in the offices of the president and the Supreme Leader, a 
comparison supported by recent power struggles between Ayatollah Khamenei and Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. However, as is often the case when representative and clerical bodies are in 
conflict, the office with significant religious legitimacy takes precedence.52  
 In Article 9, the government is charged with the task of preserving the “freedom, 
independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the country” against not only external threats, but 
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52 Article 6 states: “In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of 
public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the President, the representatives of the 
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articles of this Constitution.” 
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also internal actors. The article states that no institution can infringe on freedoms, even in 
circumstances designed to protect the country. However, it also states that “no individual … has 
the right to infringe in the slightest way on the political, cultural, economic, and military 
independence … of Iran.” Although in the case of foreign powers or political institutions these 
mandates appear practical enough on their face, in the case of individuals the implementation of 
this article is less clear. One example of these conflicting mandates is the modest dress 
regulations on women, which preserves the Islamic culture of Iran but impedes the freedom of 
individuals to dress in a way they choose.53  
 Section Three of the constitution outlines the rights of the people, as well as freedom of 
assembly and the press. Although qualified by ambiguous language favoring Islamic criteria, the 
constitution calls on government to protect fundamental human rights, rights of prisoners and 
specifically highlights the need for government to create an atmosphere favorable for women. 
The brief articles of this particular section are largely vague, and provide no guarantee of 
education, medical care or more than basic representation in court. S. Waqar Hasib wrote, 
A number of these provisions [outlining rights of the people] are 
self contradictory. For example, “publications and the press have 
freedom of expression, except when  it  is  detrimental  to  the  
fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public,” 
leaving one to wonder what exactly “freedom of expression”  
entails  under  Iranian  constitutional law. Similarly, the 
Constitution guarantees a right to “freedom”  of  association,  
where  parties, societies,  and  professional  associations  are 
permitted,  provided  “they  do  not  violate  the principles  of  
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independence,  freedom,  national unity,  the  criteria  of  Islam,  or  
the  basis  of  the Islamic Republic.54 
 
 Despite these contradictions and deficiencies, the Iranian constitution has facilitated a 
functioning government for over three decades. The document has been amended and reformed, 
and the interpretation of those places where Islam and democracy intersect has been debated. 
Through elections with high voter turnout, the people have registered their preferences and 
feelings on the direction of the country. Reformers and activists have sought to use the 
constitution and the framework it creates to influence the political evolution of their country. S. 
Waqar Hasib points out, “The cornerstone of [human rights activist Shirin] Ebadi’s efforts [was] 
to  use  Iranian  laws  and  Iranian  institutions  to advance  Iranian  human  rights.”55  
 This functionality and flexibility suggests that the Iranian constitution itself holds the 
elements that can lead to full democracy.  Iran does not throw out the constitution when there is 
disagreement, but rather amend the document through debate and voting, both by members of the 
government and public referendum. Although rule of law as outlined by the document is at best 
vague and at worst easily used to the advantage of those in power, the ongoing respect shown for 
the procedure and mandates proscribed 35 years ago shows a stability not seen in other regional 
states. James Buchan notes, “The revolutionary constitution, with its novel mixture of clerical 
dictatorship and liberal democracy, has proved more resilient than anyone could have imagined 
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55 Ibid. 
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Early years of the Islamic Republic: Consolidation of Power and War 
 
Following his return to Iran from France, Khomeini set about consolidating power in his 
own hands by marginalizing and persecuting those not aligned directly with the clerical class. 
Through Revolutionary Tribunals set up in early 1979, those seen as working against the Islamic 
Republic or aligned with the Shah’s government were put on trial. Amnesty International 
described the criteria for those held as such:  
 
Broadly speaking the [anti-revolutionary] category may be 
understood to encompass activities directly or indirectly in support 
of the Shah; the [counter-revolutionary] refers somewhat more 
specifically to activities directed or perceived to be directed against 
the Islamic Republic. In the case of "anti-revolutionary offences" 
criminal liability may be based only on participation in the 
"illegal" governments of the Shah.57  
 
These courts, set up hastily after the revolution, routinely tortured those being held. Many 
were detained for prolonged periods of time without being charged, were denied legal 
representation, and had no contact with the outside world. Although the total number of those 
executed during the interim period is difficult to say conclusively, it is estimated that by mid-
1980 between 800 and 1,000 executions had been carried out by the Revolutionary Tribunals.58  
Although the Revolutionary Tribunals had the support of Ayatollah Khomeini, there was 
much discussion within the government about how trials should be carried out. While many cited 
“public outrage” as necessitating organized trials to avoid the people murdering former officials, 
many felt the questionable methods violated Islamic law. Regional komitehs, designed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




58  Amnesty International, "Amnesty International Annual Report 1974/1975." 
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coordinate with Tehran, were rampantly corrupt and acting independently of regulations passed 
by the interim government. Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan questioned the direction the country 
was headed in April 1979. 
 
We see reports of executions every day in the newspaper...and such things  
made us worried...all Iranians are worried...an imbalance has been created  
throughout society. Everybody is afraid and asks about the future - if these 
Komitehs and guardians of the revolution continue their activities and also  
people acting in the names of the Komitehs and the Imam in an irresponsible  
manner, especially when they are armed, what will happen to the nation, the  
country and also the government?59 
 
  
Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was part of a loyal opposition, challenged practices carried 
out by the tribunals and continuously sought to introduce regulations based on Islamic and 
international law. In 1979, Amnesty International quoted a speech he gave,  
 
The criminals must undoubtedly be punished in view of the fact that our people  
have faced the 'devilish' order for 50 years. But the punishments must not  
exceed those stipulated by Islam. We cannot enforce the same vengeful laws as  
the former regime. Charges must be classified according to their intensity -  
those which justify execution, imprisonment, exile, bail and so on.60 
 
Ayatollah Shariatmadari was critical not only of the practices of these pseudo-courts, but 
of the entire system of government being developed. Despite being a long-time ally of Ayatollah 
Khomeini and having played a key role in Khomeini’s being named a grand ayatollah in 1963, 
Shariatmadari favored a fully democratic system of government, rather than a blended theocracy. 
Voices like his facilitated necessary debate within the government and, in some cases, resulted in 
the passing of updated regulations more in line with internationally recognized human rights. 
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Shariatmadari, however, fell victim to the vicious infighting that took place during the 
early 1980s. Those aligned with the shah were not the only targets of purging. Many of those 
who fought alongside Ayatollah Khomeini were brought before courts and publicly executed or 
forced to leave the country as hardline elements strengthened their hold on power. Leftist groups, 
secular movements and clerics like Shariatmadari were arrested, tortured or put under house 
arrest for speaking out against practices of the government or questioning the authority of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Among those forced from power was Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK), a fringe religious 
organization that initially hoped to share power with Khomeini. Soon after the founding of the 
Islamic Republic, the ruling elite turned against MEK, with numerous members being executed 
or assassinated, and eventually the group was offered refuge by Iraq’s president, Saddam 
Hussein. The group then began calling for regime change in Iran, fighting with Saddam against 
Iran and carrying out terrorist attacks allegedly at the behest of other countries. MEK has 
positioned itself as a viable alternative to the current regime despite having little to no support in 
country, thanks in part to considerable assets used to cement alliances with U.S. officials. MEK 
was taken off the U.S. terrorist watch list in 2012 following an intensive lobbying campaign by 
members of Congress.  
The purges cast a long shadow on civil society, with oppression and targeting of 
opposition activists continuing today. Although the justice system has been reformed to make 
sentencing more uniform, provide representation, and allow for appeals, the atmosphere of strict 
control has ebbed and flowed for over three decades. During the early years of the Islamic 
Republic, leadership were in what Nancy Stockdale calls “revolutionary crisis mode” as leaders 
struggled with creating effective central control. That need to preserve the revolution from 
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external and internal threats has remained a constant theme in public rhetoric and a justification 
for crackdowns. Despite the revolution taking place almost 35 years ago, the leadership 
continues using revolutionary identity to maintain an atmosphere of struggle, be it against the 
West or internal dissidents. 
 
Hostage Crisis and Deterioration of US-Iran Relations 
In 1980, Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and so began one of the 
major diplomatic crises in recent history. For 444 days, students held the embassy workers 
within the compound walls, often parading them in front of television cameras blindfolded. 
Although some hostages were released due to health concerns, 52 remained within the embassy 
for the entirety of the ordeal before being released over a year later. Participants in the hostage 
taking cite concerns over a possible U.S. coup and claimed at the time to have found documents 
suggesting a plan was in the works. An Iranian who participated in storming the embassy told 
GQ, 
 
When the revolution happened in Iran, young people were 
concerned about the intentions of the United States regarding the 
new regime. We believed the United States was against the 
revolution and that it was preparing another coup. When the Shah 
went to America, it was a confirmation of this belief…We believed 
we had a right to do this—that if we didn't attack the embassy, they 
could attack us.61  
 
This was not the first time students had stormed the embassy, but it was the first time the 
Supreme Leader appeared to back the actions. Earlier that year, students had breached the 
compound walls only to be pushed back by Iranian security at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
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It has never been verified whether the Supreme Leader was involved in orchestrating the taking 
of the embassy, despite decades of speculation on elite involvement. According to Ayatollah 
Rafsanjani, who was speaker of the Majles at the time, then president and future Supreme Leader 
Ali Khameini and himself were unaware of any plan to take the embassy. 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei and I were in Mecca when we heard news of 
the seizure of the American embassy over the radio at night, when 
we were on the roof of our domicile preparing to sleep. We were 
shocked, since we had no expectation of such an event. It was not 
our politics. Even early into the revolution’s victory, when political 
groups shouted very extreme anti-American slogans, the officials 
helped Americans who were in Iran return to their country 
uninjured, and many of them even carried their property with them. 
Once, when an armed group attacked the American embassy and 
occupied it, a representative came on behalf of the provisional 
government and settled the problem. Thus, it is clear that neither 
the revolutionary council nor the provisional government was 
inclined to take such measures.62 
 
The hostage crisis was the end of formal U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations, and 
diplomatic normalization has yet to occur despite recent overtures, which will be discussed 
below. The purposeful humiliation of the United States continues to tarnish Iran’s image in the 
public eye, and the failure of President Jimmy Carter to resolve the crisis is invoked as a low 
point in U.S. power projection. The seeming irrationality and intractability of the affair left the 
lasting impression that Iran cannot be trusted and hopes to harm the United States, just as U.S. 
involvement in the only war Iran has been directly involved in did to the impression of the 
United States in Iran. 
 
The Iran-Iraq War 
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 Shortly after the ousting of the shah and the founding of the Islamic Republic, Iran was 
faced with invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The Ba’athist regime in the neighboring country 
was not pleased with the development of a Shi’ite clerical regime in Iran and sought to strike 
when the new government was at its weakest. It was felt in the West that Hussein could topple 
the theocracy, freeing the United States to reinstate pro-Western leadership. As a result, the UN 
Security Council did not condemn the Iraqi invasion and labeled Iran as an aggressor despite its 
not having provoked a war. Syria was the only nation that provided public support and assistance 
to Iran during the war, with most countries choosing to provide logistical support and weapons to 
Iraq.  
As time wore on, and the war continued to drag out, tactics deteriorated as each side 
sought the advantage. Civilians were targeted on both sides, seeking to break a stalemate and 
gain the upper hand. Iraq launched notorious chemical weapons campaigns against Iran’s cities, 
including Tehran. Iran, which had a significant disadvantage militarily, called on identity politics 
to recruit youths. The government portrayed those who were killed as martyrs. Using Shi’ite 
symbolism, like Imam Hossein – grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and key figure in Shia 
Islam -- on his white horse, the government was able to recruit young people who were willing to 
storm the Iraqi lines in waves and sweep minefields, regardless of the threat to their lives.  
However, the prolonged conflict did not lead to the unraveling of the theocratic system. 
In fact, the opposite occurred. Following the traumatic eight-year struggle, a truce was mediated 
by the UN, and the Iranian government was still standing. Iranian leaders had taken on the power 
of the Western world, and while they didn’t emerge victorious, they didn’t come out defeated. 
This consolidated power in the hands of the mullahs, and created another sticking point with the 
United States, which provided Iraq with the weapons used to kill or injure close to 100,000 in the 
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conflict. Many other Iranians are struggling today with lasting health issues due to the chemical 
weapons used. Ray Takeyh explains, 
 
The regime’s ability to sustain an eight-year conflict reflected its 
resilience and ability to mobilize society and consolidate its power 
under duress. The state that was often viewed as a passing and 
transient phenomenon proved that it could deal with domestic 
challenges and international isolation while waging a total war.63 
 
The perhaps strangest element of this war was that Israel, the United State’s primary ally 
in the region, was providing Iran, a sworn enemy, with the tools needed to weaken Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. It has been alleged by ranking officials that the two countries worked together 
during the war, with Israel providing surveillance assistance to Iran. Israel saw Saddam Hussein 
as a greater threat than the Islamic Republic and as a result did not want to see an emboldened 
Iraq with influence in Iran. The war also resulted in the Iran-Contra Scandal, which rocked the 
Ronald Reagan presidency when it broke that the Reagan administration was selling arms to 
embargoed Iran and planned to use the money to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.  
 
 The conflict greatly influenced Iran’s security calculations, and continues to do so today, 
which in turn impacts the viability of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty designed to keep 
member states from developing nuclear weapons. Among the lessons taken away from the eight 
year war was the willingness of world powers to turn against Iran, even in cases when Iran was 
not the aggressor. When Iran was unable to secure any substantial support through the United 
Nations, and powers like the United States began aiding Iraqi war efforts, the idea that Iran’s 
security could be guaranteed by any other state was starkly called into question. 
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Iranian Security Calculations  
One of the primary motivations for developing a nuclear weapons capability is the 
deterrence security it provides. Once a state goes nuclear, military options are effectively taken 
off the table. Many states, including South Africa, have changed course and accepted the NPT 
bargain as working in their favor. For those states, the benefits of the bargain and the costs of 
building a nuclear weapon and maintaining its political value through delivery systems, updating 
weaponry, and general care make it a simple calculation.  
 But what happens if a state still has the memory of a devastating invasion conducted for 
political reasons and supported by the international community? It is a leap of faith to assume 
Iran would have enough trust in the same countries they feel abandoned them in the 1980s to 
accept any kind of security assurances today. In the case of the United States, rhetoric aimed at 
dissuading Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons is compounded with a strong military presence 
in the region to create a picture that, to the Iranian regime, could look like a runup to military 
action. More specifically, the United States has military forces – and has fought wars – in 
countries on either side of Iran: Afghanistan and Iraq. Through this lens, security assurances are 
meaningless due to Iran’s inability to truly trust another state to follow through on any agreement 
made.  
The Iranian leadership suffers from what Hooman Majd calls “superiority and inferiority 
complexes”.64 By this, he means that Iran is the “heir to the Persian Empire,” a history rich in art, 
literature, leaders, importance and influence. But at the same time, Iranian leaders struggle with 
international isolation, economic hardship and the sense of being something of an underdog. 
They are constantly seeking international influence and legitimacy; being in direct control of 
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one’s own security is a primary measure of independence, in their minds. The regime has, since 
1979, built its identity on the idea of non-alignment. During the Cold War, this meant a slogan of 
“Neither East Nor West”65; today, it means not allowing another state, especially the United 
States, dictate your security strategy.  
 
 In 1989, Supreme Leader Khomeini passed away. Until very near Khomeini's death the 
assumed successor and seemingly anointed choice of Khomeini himself had been Ayatollah 
Montazeri, an established hardline cleric with revolutionary credentials. But when Montazeri 
began challenging state policies Khomeini pulled support for him, and the government 
scrambled to find a replacement. With the charismatic leader of the revolution gone, the 
possibility of a power vacuum was a grave threat to the regime. Remarkably, even in the shadow 
of the war of attrition being waged with Iraq, officials followed mandated procedure and 
maintained order during the transfer of power. Although the Assembly of Experts could decide 
to do away with the office of Supreme Leader and fill the role with a three-member council, in 
the end Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani was able to bring together a coalition behind Ali 
Khamenei. 
 Ali Khamenei was serving as president at the time of his being named Supreme Leader. 
He had been a devoted member of the revolutionary elite, but had little of the clerical support 
enjoyed by his contemporaries. Having studied philosophy and literature, he had an admiration 
for parts of Western culture, including the works of Victor Hugo. Akbar Ganji, in his profile of 
Khamenei for Foreign Affairs, writes, “He was a man of music, poetry, and novels as well as 
religious law. No other present-day marja (senior ayatollah) or prominent faqih (Islamic jurist) 
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has such a cosmopolitan past.66 This blending of Islamic teachings and global culture made him a 
unique and unexpected choice for Supreme Leader. 
 Khamenei was not recognized as a grand ayatollah when his name was put forward. As a 
hojatoleslam, one step below Ayatollah in the Islamic clerical establishment, he could not 
officially be nominated for office. The advocacy carried out by Ayatollah Rafsanjani succeeded 
in not only securing him the title of grand ayatollah, but also in having him approved to follow 
Khomeini. His lack of clerical legitimacy forced him to rely on Rafsanjani in a way that he 
sought to distance himself from soon after assuming office, particularly through the use of 
fatwas. As his religious edicts were unchallenged by senior Shi’ite leaders, his power as a 
religious authority grew. 
  
Iran After Khomeini 
 
 The period between 1989 and 1997 has been called a “Second Republic” for Iran. Having 
survived the Iran-Iraq War, the leaders were faced with internal issues ranging from the need to 
rebuild areas destroyed by bombing campaigns to an unsupportable birthrate. Robin Wright 
explains, “Iran's theocracy slowly came to recognize that it was endangering its own agenda by 
ignoring the state's real problems.”67 In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the political spectrum opened up as factions proposed solutions to the 
numerous issues facing the country. 
 The extent of political differences in Iran is difficult to express and do not follow 
religious lines as is sometimes suggested, with religious leaders falling at numerous places along 
the spectrum. The most widely used categories are not political parties as much as umbrella 
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terms, under which political actors can exist at several points on the spectrum. At one end are 
reformers, which includes groups that favor moderation, relations with the West and the opening 
of society. Moderates or pragmatists can fall on either side of the center and often move between 
right and left, depending on conditions. Hard-liners are conservative, standing in opposition to 
relations with the United States and advocating strict adherence to Islamic societal guidelines, 
such as dress codes. Principlists fall at the far end of the right, despite relying heavily on 
populism to gain support. Principlists favor harsh rhetoric and resistance, an approach 
exemplified by former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose second term ended in 2013. 
Shireen Hunter further explains, 
 
Many individuals who started as radicals went through a learning 
process about Iran's internal realities and the facts of international 
life. Under the impact of its economic and political problems, and 
the reactions of the outside world, these people have moderated 
their views...Whatever words are used to characterize the opposing 
camps, it is clear that the basic structure of Iranian society is 
marked by deep national dichotomies-between Persian nationalism 
and Islam, modernization and cultural purity, economic efficiency 
and social justice.68 
 
 Two presidents served during the 1990s, both pushing Iran towards stability through 
economic growth and opening society. The first, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, moved 
from his role as speaker of the Majles to the presidency in 1989, succeeding Ali Khamenei. As a 
shrewd man with considerable personal wealth amassed since the revolution, he had a pragmatic 
side that lent itself well to the reconstruction of war-torn Iran. Rafsanjani embraced free market 
economics and encouraged industry and education to become more competitive. He introduced 
the practice of creating five-year economic plans, the goal of which was to create an environment 
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conducive to foreign investors and economic liberalization. He also oversaw reform of the 
constitution, which streamlined government by doing away with the office of the prime minister 
and strengthened the presidency. Rafsanjani worked closely with the Supreme Leader, balancing 
policy initiatives with broader state policy to minimize conflict within the regime.   
 The second, Mohammad Khatami, was elected president in 1997 through a landslide 
victory, securing 70 percent of the vote.  Suzanne Maloney notes the significance of Khatami’s 
election, stating, “While politics in the Islamic Republic had always featured a strong element of 
competition among the array of factions that comprised the revolutionary coalition, the Second 
of Khordad was the first time since the revolution that an Iranian presidential election proved 
genuinely competitive.”69 The cleric and former minister of culture advocated a Reformist 
platform, focused on rebuilding relationships with the international community and greater 
leniency domestically. Nearly 10 years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iran Khatami 
governed had largely settled into itself. The population was more educated, saw higher levels of 
literacy and had begun to climb out of the economic struggles of the war. He built an 
administration pulled largely from Reformist circles, including Western-educated diplomats and 
officials, and worked hard to foster dialogue between Iran and the international community. To 
this end he sought to counter Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” with his own call for 
increased cooperation, resulting in 2001 being named the United Nations Year of Dialogue 
Among Civilizations. Since leaving office, Khatami has continued this work through his 
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The Iranian Economy 
 
The Iranian economy is a mix of nationalized industries and private holdings, with 
regular involvement of the Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an 
elite arm of the military, which has enjoyed considerable influence under Supreme Leader 
Khamenei. The IRGC has been allegedly active in conflicts around the world, stretching Iranian 
influence in places across the region through training and arming fighters. Most recently IRGC 
fighters have been reportedly supporting Bashar al-Assad in Syria. With the special operations 
Basiji forces, the IRGC has been able to build up an extensive economic empire. Through 
government contracts the organization has secured holdings in numerous infrastructure and 
energy sector projects, and plays a role in NGO religious groups, as well. The role played by the 
IRGC in the black market is murky and little understood, but it is believed the group has a hand 
in a number of illicit activities, including the sale of software used to bypass internet censorship. 
Over the course of the 1990s and under the guidance of Rafsanjani and Khatami, Iran saw 
considerable economic recovery. GDP growth, though remaining sluggish early on, hit 5.1 
percent in 200070 while unemployment fell to 9.1 percent in 1996 before climbing to 16 percent 
four years later.71 The World Bank agreed to fund public projects, and investments from the 
public and private sector bolstered the energy and industrial sectors. The OECD rated the risk of 
doing business with Iran at four, rather than the previous rating of six, on a scale of ten. By 1999 
around 15 percent of the economy had been privatized, reversing the mass nationalization of 
industry and property undertaken after the fall of the shah.72 
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 With these economic changes also came a shift in society. As the economy rebounded, 
the educated Iranian population began calling for a more open society and greater interaction 
with the rest of the world. What had once been strict adherence to state policy became a more 
nuanced and ambiguous system, wherein laws forbid activities but lack of implementation or 
prosecution has led to practices hitherto unheard of since 1979. An example of this is the 
consumption of alcohol. Although technically illegal, under President Khatami a lack of serious 
efforts to prevent this behavior led to a vivid and active nightlife across cities. Among the classes 
that benefited under this more liberal state were urban students and women. 
 
Women in Iran 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a prime example of the oversimplification of Muslim 
women and their relationship to the state. In the case of Iran, the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
provided a clean break with the Western world, a break that can be seen starkly when comparing 
images from before and after Islamic law was implemented. The images are striking. Before the 
revolution, women were seen wearing the latest Western fashions, just as comfortable on the 
streets of Tehran or Shiraz as they would be in New York City or Chicago. Following the 
revolution, dark chadors and headscarves cover the hair and the bodies of women in the street to 
varying degrees, conforming to individual interpretations of government mandated modesty.  
These visual impressions, however, do not provide a complete picture. The common 
discourse on Iran, which often laments the end of the shah’s reign, falsely equates modernity and 
secularization, suggesting that women being able to wear skirts gives them greater freedom than 
granting them access to effective family planning. While certain areas of women’s lives in Iran 
have been constricted and often repressed by the central government, there have been tangible 
gains in women’s rights since the revolution, often championed by the theocracy itself. Although 
 	   57	  
	  
women still have a long road to equality, the Islamic Republic of Iran has instituted reforms that 
have improved the lives and status of women since 1979, challenging the dominant narrative of 
Islamist leadership and women’s empowerment being mutually exclusive.  
Healthcare is an area in which Iran has made incredible and important strides forward 
since 1979, be it overall access to primary care or providing access to family planning. Under the 
shah, huge portions of the Iranian population were unable to get even the most basic of 
healthcare, and women in rural communities were often unable to get the care they needed 
during pregnancy or childbirth. In response to these problems, the leadership in Tehran placed 
high priority on increasing access to healthcare around the country. To serve rural populations, 
Iran was able to develop a system by which medical professionals provide local care, with 
medical facilities at community, regional, and national levels providing necessary services as 
needed. Community clinics serve as primary care providers, ensuring rural communities get the 
medical care they need. This program successfully created 17,000 health care facilities, 
providing 23 million people with services. A similar program is currently being developed, based 
on the Iranian model, for use in the underserved Mississippi Delta.73 
One of Iran’s greatest health care success stories lies in the ambitious family planning 
program implemented after the Iran-Iraq War. During the conflict, the government encouraged 
population growth in response to the high number of casualties inflicted by Iraqi forces. Once the 
conflict came to an end, it quickly became clear that growth rates were not supportable in the 
long term. The result can be seen today with the bulging youth population across the region. The 
Iranian government therefore embarked on a plan encompassing numerous means to reduce the 
population growth rate. Education in family planning methods combined with free contraception 
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on demand and financial incentives to keep family sizes small successfully has resulted in a 
drastic reduction in the growth rate to 2 per woman in 2000 from 6.6 births per woman in 1977 
and an increase in the number of women using all forms of contraception. A USIP report 
explains, “In 2012, 74 percent of married women aged 15 to 49 practice family planning. Some 
60 percent use one of several forms of contraception, while one-third rely on female or male 
sterilization. These rates are more or less comparable to those in the United States, according to 
the U.S.-based Population Reference Bureau.”74  
This program, however, has recently been changed due to the growth rate being too low 
to maintain the Iranian population. To combat the impending crisis, officials have increased 
mandated paid maternity leave and introduced paternity leave, as well as decreasing the 
financial incentives of maintaining small families. Universities have also pulled family planning 
courses and funding for family planning has been cut from the budget. However, the ministry of 
health may not be able to fully remove family planning education from schools due to the many 
other health topics covered in such classes. Iranian men and women have now become 
accustomed to control over their reproductive health, and a full abandonment of the program 
will likely face strong opposition across the socio-economic spectrum.75 
Through the family planning program and the healthcare initiatives undertaken, the 
number of women receiving medical care prior to and during childbirth reached near 100 percent 
due to increased access to health services for rural women. The maternal mortality rate has 
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continuously dropped, and women’s life expectancy at time of birth has increased to 70.4 years 
in 2010 from 54 years in 1970.76 
Education is another area where women have seen substantial gains, although recent 
university policies have threatened some of that progress and will be discussed shortly. During 
the 1979 revolution, increasing rural access to education was a central promise of the leadership, 
and by 1984 they reached near 100 percent primary school attendance. Secondary education is 
also close to 100 percent, while higher education is attained by 43 percent of the population as of 
2010. Literacy rates have grown to 85 percent overall and 98 percent of those age 15 to 24.77 
Under the shah these numbers were at around 30%. 
 Women and girls have gained substantially under Iranian education reforms. Gender 
parity has been achieved in primary school attendance and 97 percent parity at the secondary 
level. In higher education, women make up 60 percent of all graduates, with that number rising 
to 70 percent in some engineering and science programs.78 Female literacy has gone to 80 
percent today from 24 percent in 1976, with that number rising to 98 percent for women under 
the age of 24.79 According to UNESCO, Iran had the highest ratio of women to men in higher 
education among sovereign nations as of 2005. 
 However, a number of universities around the country recently announced plans to bar 
women from 77 programs, primarily sciences and engineering. A similar proposal was put forth 
in 2011, but was defeated after public officials denounced the plan. One of the most vocal 
opponents was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose daughter received her degree in 
Mechanical Engineering from the University of Tehran. There are several reasons behind this 
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proposal, ranging from high unemployment due to sanctions and high numbers of graduates to 
the need for increased population growth. The ban, regardless of stated intentions, will result in a 
loss of an educational edge for women in critical technological fields, further isolating them from 
these careers in an already hostile workforce. 
 Iranian women, despite gains in education and access to family planning, continue to 
struggle in the workforce. Employment in Iran has fluctuated greatly since the revolution, due 
first to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and more recently by consistently increased international 
sanctions on the economy because of Iran’s quest for nuclear power. Women’s presence in the 
workforce has fluctuated with those events, their employment during times of crisis made more 
precarious by their being the last to be hired and the first to be fired. As of 1971 women made up 
12.5 percent of the workforce, a number that rose to 43 percent in 2005 before falling in 2010 to 
27 percent. In 1986, women made up just 6.1 percent of the workforce.80  
 Since the revolution, women have entered the workforce in numerous roles, be they 
education, medicine or even cab driving. Perceptions of gender still have a large impact on what 
positions are considered “women’s work,” as is true in many other countries. Women are barred 
from serving as judges due to their being too “emotional,” although women are allowed to 
volunteer for the Basij military force. Regionally, Iran was above the Middle East and North 
Africa regional average for women’s share of the labor force in 2006. It ranked second overall 
with 35 percent.81  
Harder to measure is the role of women’s political agency and their relationship to the 
state. It’s impossible to reduce such a complex and fluid situation to comparable statistics and 
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numbers in an effective way. As is true with women’s agency around the world, gains and losses 
occur simultaneously across various areas, changing sometimes suddenly. Iran also complicates 
the matter further, with official policy differing from implementation in some cases.  
Amnesty International reported in 2011 that female activists were subject to arrest, 
torture, rape, and general harassment by authorities. Although stonings were not reported during 
the particular time frame, laws in Iran continue to threaten women with this punishment. Laws 
requiring male permission for things like travel and marriage remain on the books, taking 
important decisions from women’s hands.  These conditions changed very little between 2011 
and 2013, with the Human Rights Watch report almost word for word reflecting the 2011 
concerns for women’s rights. Women’s issues in Iran tend to be impacted by the broader political 
situation, with crackdowns on “immoral” behavior serving as a means for the regime to flex their 
power in response to real or perceived unrest. This trend can be seen in the aftermath of the 2009 
protests, when numerous women’s rights activists were arrested.  
 In the case of Iran and other Muslim majority nations, the blame for women’s struggles 
and oppression tends to fall on Islamic fundamentalism. This term is often applied across 
sectarian lines, across political lines and across a number of policies in various countries with 
little attention paid to other possible forces at play. Islam has fewer explicit guidelines than other 
faiths, with much left up to interpretation and subject to particular context. By neglecting this, 
those who would use the term Islamic fundamentalism falsely paint Islamist leadership as 
monolithic and universally fanatic in their religious interpretation. For Iran, this simplification 
masks a dynamic domestic conversation on gender equality, with clergy, politicians and the 
population falling at various points along the debate spectrum.  
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 Iranian women hold government positions, with 27 percent of ministerial (or vice 
presidential) positions and 2.8 percent of parliament seats being held by women. This is low 
compared with 2000, when women held 4.9 percent of parliament seats. However, women are 
still barred from the presidency by the candidate vetting body, the Guardian Council, despite 
there being no direct restrictions on women running for or holding executive office.82 Under 
President Rouhani, the first female spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry was appointed, and 
Rouhani’s campaign promises included increasing female representation in government. 
 Women live under a vague web of intersecting restrictions, including clothing 
requirements and bans on unmarried or unrelated men and women socializing. These two 
governmental regulations are a prime example of the complexity of Iranian policy towards 
women, with varying degrees of implementation and obedience. The rural/urban divide is very 
stark in Iran, with less attention paid to a young man and woman on the street in Tehran than 
may be the case in a smaller, often more religious village. As a means to get around such 
restrictions on men and women spending time together, temporary marriages ranging from one 
day to multiple years are common and official.83  
Although treated by many in the West as a one-size-fits-all limitation, government 
restrictions on women’s dress actually varies greatly depending on the individual women in 
question. In some cases, women don full chador, with only their face showing. In others, women 
loosely cover their hair with colorful scarves and wear long, tight coats that differ very little from 
what one might see on a city street in the United States. Falling in the center are women wearing 
traditional hijab and manteau, a long coat designed to obscure body shape, hair covered and 
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figure mostly masked. Black is the color most often associated with Islamic dress, but images of 
Iranian streets show a rainbow of colors, patterns, and materials.  
 The hijab is a charged topic across the Western world, serving as a visual representation 
of Islam’s supposed hostility to women. Secular movements have often moved to ban the hijab, 
and in the US and Europe it has become a target of Islamophobic propaganda. In Iran, women 
are required to conform to Islamic codes of modesty, which means wearing some form of hijab. 
This, however, is no less a restriction than denying women the choice of hijab at all, as has been 
done throughout history and into modern times in places like France. Western rejection of hijab 
is no more than a reactionary denial of women’s freedom of choice, falsely equating Western 
norms with modernity and Eastern norms with societal regression.  
 Despite the Western depiction of Iranian women as nameless victims of male domination, 
many women in Iran have become successful activists, political figures, and champions of 
change in their selected fields. Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of former presidential candidate Mir 
Hossein Mousavi, captured the imagination of Western media by appearing alongside her 
husband and headlining her own political rallies in the runup to the 2009 presidential election. 
She was the first wife to take a leading role in a presidential campaign, prior to which she was 
appointed as chancellor of al-Zahra University in Tehran and was a key advisor to President 
Mohammad Khatami.  
 Although President Ahmadinejad’s wife, Azam Farahi, has remained out of the spotlight 
since her husband came into office in 2005, she has also had a successful career. Farahi studied 
at the University of Tehran, where she eventually became a professor. When her husband was 
appointed mayor of Tehran and refused his salary, Farahi supported the family. As First Lady, 
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she has championed some causes and written letters to leaders in the Middle East calling on them 
to provide assistance to Gazans.84  
 Shirin Ebadi, though in exile since the 2009 crackdown on dissidents, was the first 
Iranian to receive a Nobel Peace Prize, awarded in recognition of her work on human rights in 
Iran as a lawyer and founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Center in Tehran. Masoumeh 
Ebtekar became the first female vice president of the Environmental Protection Organization in 
1997, under the Khatami administration, and was active in international environmental 
initiatives. Following her term, she was elected as councilwoman in Tehran, running twenty 
working groups on environmental issues. She is also an accomplished professor, teaching 
immunology at Tarbiat Modares University and having contributed writings to numerous 
medical and environmental books.  
 The women’s rights movement in Iran is described as one of the most dynamic in the 
region, buoyed by higher levels of education and the freedom that comes with access to family 
planning. Iran also has an advantage many countries in the Middle East: support among men. A 
2007 Gallup poll showed that 89% of Iranian men and women feel women should have equal 
legal rights, 77% feel they should be allowed to hold leadership roles, and 60% feel they should 
be able to initiate a divorce.85 Given the male dominated public sector and political landscape, 
this support is critical for women to win more than token victories. Although often cast as 
unresponsive, the Iranian government has acted as a result of powerful lobbying. One example of 
such is transgender rights. Following an intensive campaign, not only was transgender rights 
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recognized, the government also offers financial assistance for sex reassignment surgery and 
reissues birth certificates reflecting the change.86 
Iranian clerics and politicians, particularly Reformists, vocally support women’s issues. 
Members of the clerical establishment often challenge restrictions on women through an Islamic 
lens, calling into question the basis of legitimacy for many Iranian policies. Former President 
Khatami was quoted in 2005 as saying, "We should have a comprehensive view of the role of 
women and before anything else, should not regard women as second-class citizens. We should 
all believe that both men and women have the capability to be active in all fields, and I 
emphasize, in all fields."87 
In a much publicized recent protest, men across Iran dressed in women’s clothing in 
response to a court mandated punishment of dressing a man in women’s clothing and walking 
him through the streets of a Kurdish town in Northern Iran. Interestingly, this protest used the 
slogan “Being a woman is not a way for humiliation or punishment,” not only rejecting the 
punishment but the idea that being a woman is shameful in itself. Members of Parliament also 
sent a letter to the Justice Ministry, calling the sentence “humiliating to women”. A similar 
protest took place in 2011, after an arrested protester was accused of attempting to escape prison 
wearing a headscarf. Men took to the internet to not only post images of themselves wearing 
headscarves, but to take the opportunity to recognize women’s political activity, such as this text 
posted by one supporter: 
 
For many years, women in my country have been side-by-side with 
men, wearing men’s clothes, struggling. Tonight I am happy and 
honored to wear women’s clothes and be even a small part of the 
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rightful struggle of people to express gratitude and excellence to the 
women of my country.88  
 
 As women around the world continue to work for equal rights, Iran serves as an 
interesting example of the complexity of women’s status in an Islamic nation and the ways in 
which Islam and female empowerment can work hand in hand. In supporting women’s 
movement and gender equality in Iran, it is important to remember that secularization and 
modernity are not necessarily synonymous and to recognize the advances made by activists and 
political leaders alike. Through education and healthcare, the government has created a 
generation of women and men unwilling to accept gender inequality, and the future of Iran will 
be determined by those men and women. 
 
Student Protests of 1999 
In July, 1999, Reformist newspaper Salam was shuttered by the courts. The publication 
was run by the Association of Combatant Clerics, the Reform party of which President Khatami 
is a member. In response, students in Tehran held peaceful demonstrations calling for press 
freedom. That night, the dormitories were raided by alleged members of the Basij paramilitary 
forces. At least one student was killed in the violence, while hundreds of others were wounded 
and arrested.  
The raid sparked unrest not only in Tehran, but in cities across Iran. Demonstrations and 
riots were carried out for days, as police clashed with protesters and Basij tried to discredit 
demonstrators by carrying out vandalism while dressed as students. When students attempted to 
storm the Ministry of Interior, President Khatami denounced the protests and called for an end to 
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what had effectively turned Tehran into a war zone. Despite his likely hand in sending Basiji to 
target protesters, Ayatollah Khamenei urged restraint by authorities, denouncing the use of force 
against those challenging the Supreme Leader and the regime.89  
The protests were the worst seen in Iran since the Islamic Revolution, and are credited for 
creating the student movement. Although before 1999 students had been politically active, the 
unrest not only showed the level at which they were able to rally against oppressive policies, but 
the impact that organization could have. That potential was capitalized upon again in 2009, when 
the largely student supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi rallied in the streets after the allegedly 
fraudulent re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the crackdown on opposition groups that 
followed, university curriculum and professors were targeted, with monitoring of student groups 
and dismissal of educators.   
The young, educated classes are often at the vanguard of reform, and Iran is no exception. 
The clashes that took place in 1999 have come to signify the ongoing conflict between reform 
and the entrenched regime, as young people continue to push against policies and practices they 
see as oppressive. The ability of the student population to organize is a very real threat to those 
elements of theocracy that hold back the realization of full democracy, not only through protest 
but also through the ballot box. In the 2013 election, moderate Hassan Rouhani was swept to 
office in a fervor not unlike that surrounding Mousavi, albeit more subdued, leaving his 
conservative challengers behind by a huge margin.   
  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Nuclear Issue 
In 2005, with President Khatami unable to run for a third term due to constitutional term 
limits, the mayor of Tehran entered the presidential race. Little known and not well liked by 
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elites, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was considered an underdog, unlikely to beat big names like 
Rafsanjani. Yet, when the runoff election found Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad competing directly, 
the former professor and once governor was elected and entered office not only with a popular 
mandate, but the support of the Supreme Leader. Thus ended the Reformist era of Iranian 
politics, and began a period marked by ostracisation and economic struggle. 
 Ahmadinejad’s presidential campaign worked hard to portray the candidate as a man of 
the people, highlighting his piety, humble upbringing, and commitment to ending governmental 
corruption. As governor of Ardabil province and mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad cultivated his 
reputation carefully through both priorities in office and choices in his personal life. While 
serving as mayor, Ahmadinejad refused his salary, calling for the money to be used to better the 
city. At this time he and his family also refused accommodation at the mayoral compound, 
choosing instead to remain in their private, modest home. Priority was given to religious 
projects, including transit to a Shiite holy site outside of the city, and providing grants for small 
businesses, a project that failed to achieve the desired economic growth.  
 The greatest failure of the Ahmadinejad administration was, ironically, the same issue 
that swept him into office. In many ways, the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was 
reactionary following the revelation of Iran’s secret nuclear program. Voters were unimpressed 
by the meager progress made by the Khatami administration and responded to the anti-Western 
rhetoric employed by the Ahmadinejad campaign in light of sanctions imposed by the US. The 
regime saw the underdog candidate, with no international profile to speak of, as an ideal 
president following the strongly supported Reformist cleric Khatami. What Iran got instead, 
however, was a firebrand unafraid of using an international platform to pander to his own 
constituents. 
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The Iranian Nuclear Program 
 
Iran’s nuclear program can be divided into two distinct periods. The first of these is prior 
to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In 1957, the United States reached an agreement with Iran to 
begin providing assistance in developing peaceful nuclear industry under the Atoms for Peace 
Program. This was the beginning of US engagement on nuclear matters with the Pahlavi 
monarchy, a government in close alliance with the US particularly on military matters. When the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was opened for signing in 1968, Iran became a signatory, and 
when the treaty was ratified by the Majles the government was obligated not to seek the 
weaponization of their nuclear program. The second period is following the Islamic Revolution, 
following which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini did not terminate Iranian participation in 
the NPT. In fact the program was shut down until the 1980s, when the government resumed 
nuclear work citing energy needs.90  
 Since 1968, Iran has at no time left the NPT or expelled International Atomic Energy 
Agency inspectors. They are beholden to a Safeguards Agreement that allows IAEA inspectors 
access to facilities and people connected to the nuclear program in order to verify that all 
declared nuclear material is being used solely for peaceful purposes. The IAEA has considered 
Iran a special case since the secret construction of a nuclear facility at Natanz was exposed in 
2002, and the agency has a near constant presence at many of their known facilities.91 
 Iran has enforced Additional Protocol in the past, which allowed access to additional 
facilities not covered by the Safeguards Agreement, but currently stands free from any 
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obligations outside of the Safeguards Agreement, which requires access to all known nuclear 
facilities and workers engaged in the nuclear program. In 1978, just one year before the fall of 
the monarchy, Iran signed on to additional safeguards in exchange for “most favored nation” 
status with the US government, which would ensure ease in reprocessing US fuel.92 This and 
every other agreement made between the United States and the Pahlavi government did not 
survive the revolution, however, and Iran withdrew from all additional obligations. In 2003, 
Iranian leadership agreed to the Additional Protocol, a supplement to Safeguards Agreement, that 
would give inspectors increased access to the nuclear program, although it was never ratified by 
the Majles.93 Iran has since withdrawn, citing international treatment after being referred to the 
United Nations Security Council.94 
In 2002, the fortunes of Iran changed drastically when secret nuclear facilities were 
revealed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) spokesman Alireza Jafarzadeh. 
The nuclear site at Natanz and heavy water reactor at Arak were being constructed without IAEA 
knowledge or oversight, an announcement that validated the US calls for sanctions and isolation. 
At the time, President Khatami’s administration had developed working relationships with 
numerous countries in the EU, and the president himself enjoyed warm professional relationships 
with a number of heads of state. Due to this, and the EU’s dependence on Iranian oil, the US still 
faced objection to sweeping sanctions although the seeds of mistrust had been planted. These 
secret facilities were particularly suspicious in light of the IAEA experience with Iraq, where 
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Saddam Hussein used limited access to nuclear sites to create cover for a secret program being 
pursued. 
 In 2003, the year after international concern mounted following the revelation of Iran’s 
nuclear program, Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a verbal fatwa, or religious edict, against the 
production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear weapons.95 Under this edict, Iran would not be 
permitted to conduct a weapons program or use a weapon attained through another country. But 
the international community has concerns regarding the validity of the fatwa, which has not been 
put on paper as it were. Some cite a Shia teaching allowing for followers to “lie” in order to 
protect themselves, although that applies only to hiding their Shia faith.96 During his United 
Nations speech in 2013, President Obama referenced the fatwa, suggesting US officials are 
reconsidering the legal validity of the edict. Part of a 2012 Iranian proposal to the P5+1 included 
submitting the fatwa to the United Nations, making it a binding international law on the Islamic 
Republic. The talks stalled, however, and the proposal was shelved until negotiations resumed.  
In November, 2013, the first agreement since 2003 was reached between the Permanent 
Five Members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) and Iran following intensive 
negotiation. The negotiations featured the first direct talks between high level US and Iranian 
officials since 1979, a breakthrough heralded by diplomacy advocates. The interim deal struck 
stands for six months and has yet to go into effect. Under it, Iran will halt any activities that 
could increase their enrichment capacity, including work at the heavy water reactor at Arak. All 
20% enrichment will cease and all stockpiles will be reduced to under 5% enrichment or be 
neutralized through conversion to fuel rods, while stockpiles of 3.5% enriched uranium cannot 
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have any net gain in the six month period. Along with increased inspections and monitoring by 
the IAEA, these restrictions could considerably curb any breakout capacity. In exchange, limited 
sanctions relief and assistance totalling about $7 billion will be provided by the US and EU, 
including easing of crippling restrictions on the purchase of Iranian oil. 
 As it stands today, Iran is considered noncompliant with IAEA regulations, although 
negotiations will continue in attempts to build on the first agreement and resolve all disputes. 
The international community has doubts regarding the aims of their program, with many 
wondering if they are seeking nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons breakout capacity. Although 
Iran has maintained they are operating only a peaceful program, the IAEA is unable to verify the 
complete validity of their claim. In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iranian lack of 
cooperation troubling, and in a divided vote called on the government to increase and accelerate 
confidence building measures to clear up any concerns regarding their nuclear program.97 Since 
then, Iran has failed to fully convince the international community of their peaceful nuclear aims, 
and each IAEA report has called on them to resolve these issues. In a report released in June, 
2012, the Director General of the IAEA said this: 
 
The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear  
material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement.  
However, Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to  
enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the  
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,  
and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in  
peaceful activities. I urge Iran to take steps towards the full  
implementation of all relevant obligations in order to establish 
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its 
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Prior to the 2002 revelation of Iran’s Natanz facility, the United States voiced concern 
over their activities. Although sanctions were sought, other members of the UN Security Council 
were unconvinced of the US allegations, and as a result refused to back any action. When a deal 
made by President Mohammed Khatami offering voluntary enforcement of the Additional 
Protocol fell through following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, the US-led 
sanctions efforts resulted in a series of collective sanctions between 2006 and 2010, as well as 
unilateral sanctions imposed by the EU and the US.99  
 Russia and China, however, have stood as barriers to many sanctions efforts. Unlike the 
United States, these two members of the UN Security Council have close trade relations with 
Iran and have worked with them on their nuclear program even since 2002. The EU had relied on 
oil from Iran until 2012, when an embargo took effect. Russia and China resisted sanctions 
implementation on the grounds of uncertainty regarding the allegation of misappropriation of 
nuclear facilities and materials. Notably, Russia has helped complete and fuel the Iranian reactor 
at Bushehr, a project started by Germany before the revolution but halted after an Iraqi strike 
during the Iran-Iraq War. Other countries, including India and Turkey, have refused the 
enforcement of sanctions against Iran and continue doing business with the regime today.100 
 Since 2002, negotiations between Iran and world powers have been conducted in starts 
and fits, with no tangible progress made until this year. As recently as 2010 a tentative deal was 
reached that would remove most of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and have it 
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converted to fuel rods before being returned, but the deal was not approved by Supreme Leader 
Khamenei.101 Later that year, a deal was reached by Turkey and Brazil that would achieve nearly 
the same thing, but sanctions relief was rejected by the United States and the deal did not move 
forward.102Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were resumed in May, 2012, but talks stalled 
before an agreement was reached. Although technical talks continued in the interim, it wasn’t 
until the recent deal that negotiations yielded any progress. With a deal finally struck, it is 
believed by many that a solution to the nuclear crisis is the closest it has ever been, yet with the 
agreement still young the chances of it failing are considerable.  
 
Ahmadinejad’s Domestic Power Struggle 
 
 Domestically, Ahmadinejad’s first term was an exercise in how the presidency could take 
power from other institutions. He favored executive orders to working with the legislature, an 
example of which was his early on decision to allow women to attend soccer matches. The 
Majles very quickly reversed the act, but the cat and mouse style tension between the presidency 
and the legislature remained high. According to the United States Institute of Peace, 
 
He ignored established procedures, laws and regulations. He drew 
on the oil reserve fund for pet projects without consulting 
parliament. The Plan Organization, responsible for Iran’s five-year 
development plans, was abolished, as he considered long-term 
planning pointless. He stopped attending meetings of the Supreme 
Defense Council. Later in his two-term presidency, he named 
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personal envoys on the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
by-passing the foreign ministry.103 
 
He clashed with the legislature repeatedly, garnering the reputation of being difficult and 
uncompromising. With influential figures such as current Speaker of the Majles Ali Larijani 
standing against him, Ahmadinejad relied on building up his base of traditionally religious urban 
and rural voters, a move that further alienated him from the often pragmatic elite. As a result, his 
administration continues to be investigated for corruption and Ahmadinejad himself was often 
the target of calls for impeachment, although no action was taken by the legislature. The United 
States Institute of Peace explains,  
 
A populist in style and substance, Ahmadinejad distributed 
largesse to the poor and lower middle class. His presidency 
coincided with high oil prices. Oil revenue during his first five 
years equaled the total oil income for the previous 25 years, but 
was largely wasted on short-term, non-productive programs.104 
  
The eight-year presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was marked by the deterioration of 
relations with the international community. Incendiary rhetoric against Israel, questioning of the 
September 11 attacks on the United States, and general missteps such as asserting that Iran had 
no homosexual population resulted in the easy demonization on a country already little 
understood.   
 The Iranian economy saw major setbacks as international partners joined sanctions 
efforts aimed at limiting the nuclear program. Relations became difficult with countries like 
Saudi Arabia, a country already at odds with Shia led Iran. Ever mounting US-led sanctions, 
recurring condemnation by international organizations, and growing stigma against Iran in the 
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West caused many to turn against Ahmadinejad by the end of his first term. As elections drew 
nearer, it was unclear if the incumbent would be able to rally his supporters and maintain power. 
What transpired on election day was among the darkest days for democracy in Iran, and a turning 
point for the leadership. 
 
2009 Elections and Challenge for Leadership 
 
Few events in recent history have shaken the Islamic Republic as much as the 2009 
presidential election. As sanctions mounted and international isolation increased, incumbent 
Ahmadinejad faced three challengers, including Mir Hossein Mousavi. Mousavi, a former prime 
minister and long time regime insider, became the key challenger to Ahmadinejad after former 
president Khatami backed out of the race to support the Reformist frontrunner. Also in the race 
were Mehdi Karroubi, a mid-level cleric and Parliamentarian, and Revolutionary Guards 
commander Mohsen Rezai.  
 As the two week official campaign period began, attention began building around 
Mousavi both in Iran and the West. Using green as his official campaign color, Mousavi’s 
platform relied heavily on hope and change to drum up support among disenfranchised urban 
youth and those impacted by sanctions. His wife, women’s rights activist and university dean 
Zahra Rahnavard, was with him at rallies and on occasion held rallies herself, the first wife of a 
political candidate to do so. Moderate and Reform leaders backed the candidate, and rallies grew 
to thousands of people as the election drew nearer. In the US, media outlets presented Mousavi 
as an Iranian Barack Obama, coming from relative obscurity to global attention quickly with a 
new vision for his country’s future. 
The election itself was heavily covered internationally, although the question of whether 
it was really an election in a free sense remained on the table prior to election day. Although in 
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retrospect this skepticism proved correct, it would be disingenuous to claim the coming unrest 
was foreseeable given the largely orderly elections and transfers of power carried out in Iran. 
Journalists reported a high voter turnout, which they attributed to dissatisfaction with President 
Ahmadinejad. Fairly quickly after the polls closed, results were announced in favor of 
Ahmadinejad. Irregularities such as ballots going missing and polls being closed earlier than 
expected were reported on widely.105  
 The most pronounced oddity from the election was the landslide victory Ahmadinejad 
supposedly achieved. With about 63% of the vote106, he had a very clear majority and therefore 
the election would not continue to the runoff stage. It was this number -- 63% -- that raised 
concerns initially, due to the extreme disparity between his supposed margin of victory over the 
other three candidates and polls going into the election. Poll results differed greatly across the 
country, but official results in early June had Ahmadinejad leading by about twelve points.107 
Although there are many theories about why the margin was so high, the decisive victory was 
most likely handed down to avoid a runoff election. Had there been a second round, Mousavi and 
Ahmadinejad would have presumably gone head-to-head, and chances are Mousavi would have 
won with the support of Karroubi.  
 In truth, the election itself spoke more to the insecurity felt by the regime than the 
strength of the opposition. It is clear that, from the moment Ahmadinejad’s victory was 
announced, those in power were unprepared for the kind of outcry that rose from the streets. 
Khamenei struggled with what to do, as demonstrated by his back and forth decisions on the 
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matter of a recount. Initially the protests were allowed to be conducted, and the option of a 
recount was left on the table108. He had a small number of ballots recounted and some 
irregularities were allegedly investigated, but these gestures did nothing to pacify those 
demonstrating. Khamenei met with representatives of the four candidates, although no agreement 
to end the protests was made109. Until June 16th, protests had been primarily peaceful. But that 
evening, reports of violence came through as “protesters surrounded and attempted to set fire to 
the headquarters of the Basij volunteer militia... At least one man was killed.”110 On June 19th, 
seven days after the election, Khamenei announced that, “If there is any bloodshed, leaders of the 
protests will be held directly responsible”.111  
Following pleas for unrest to end and warnings of imminent crackdowns, the Basiji 
forces began clashing with protesters across Tehran. Internal rifts close to the Supreme Leader 
were exposed as the regime divided on what should be done, and while some of those voices 
were silenced through imprisonment, many of those speaking out were too powerful to eliminate 
completely. Leaders like former president Mohammed Khatami and Grand Ayatollah Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who have strong public backing and high international profiles after years 
within the power structure, continued to support Mousavi and those calling for an investigation 
into voting irregularities. Much of the true power struggle in Iran takes place behind closed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Robert F Worth, and Nazila Fathi. "Defiance Grows as Iran's Leader Sets Vote Review." New York 
Times, New York edition, sec. A1, June 16, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/middleeast/16iran.html?pagewanted=all. 
109 Nazila Fathi. "Recount Offer Fails to Quell Political Tumult in Iran." New York Times, June 17, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html?_r=1. 
110 Worth and Fathi. "Defiance Grows as Iran's Leader Sets Vote Review."  
111 Scott Peterson. "Iran's Khamenei throws down hard line with protesters." The Christian Science 
Monitor, June 19, 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0619/p06s13-wome.html. 
 	   79	  
	  
doors, and while speculation suggests that Rafsanjani was working to leverage his power 
possibly against the Supreme Leader himself, these matters are rarely made public.112 
 Many commentators asserted that the protesters hoped to overturn the Islamic Republic in 
favor of a secular democracy. During the Arab Spring, many sought to group Iran in with the 
Middle Eastern countries rising up against their rulers. But was crippling the theocracy to the 
point of overthrow ever the true goal of the movement? Certainly within the ranks of protesters 
there were those seeking more radical solutions to the problems they faced, but one would be 
hard pressed to call that the norm.  
 In his book The Ayatollah’s Democracy, Hooman Majd relays a conversation he had with 
Khatami shortly after the election took place. 
 
 “You know, some are calling it a revolution here 
and in the West in general,” I say. 
 “No!” says Khatami. “All we’re looking for is what  
is legal in Iran, for the law to prevail.”113 
 
 Later in the book, Majd describes the Green Movement as “Iran’s first real civil rights 
movement, one not so unlike the civil rights movement in the United States”114. It was not the 
goal of Mousavi and Karroubi, who took the reigns as leaders of the movement and were later 
put under house arrest, to overthrow the government. Although they donned the colors of the 
Islamic Revolution and chanted “Allah hu-Akbar” from the rooftops as they did in 1979, they 
weren’t seeking a new system. They wanted the rules of the system they were in to be played by. 
Those who stood up for the Green Movement within the country were members of the political 
elite. Karroubi is a mid-level cleric who has served as the Speaker of the Majles. Mousavi sat on 
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the Expediency Council, a title he technically held until 2012. Rafsanjani and Khatami are 
political insiders to the point of the Supreme Leader having to tolerate their speaking out on 
behalf of reforms.  “Mousavi and Karroubi still believe in the Islamic Republic; they simply 
view Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a Caesar who has subverted the republic that 
they helped create by monopolizing power at the expense of elected institutions.”115 
 
Consequences of 2009 Unrest 
The impact of the 2009 protests on political legitimacy in Iran is still felt today, both 
domestically and around the world. The unrest that took place marred what was a record of 
peaceful elections, providing a level of legitimacy to those calling for regime change. Since 
2009, those who advocate military action in response to the nuclear issue were bolstered in their 
assertions that negotiations with the Iranian government were illegitimate and not worthwhile. 
But in many ways, the unrest of 2009 forced the regime to question their direction and the 
longevity of the oppressive system they had developed. 
 
Despite the iron fist brought down against those seen as threatening hardliner elements in 
the regime, political infighting only increased following the 2009 election. Supreme Leader 
Khamenei may have thrown his support behind the incumbent president immediately following 
the election, but soon after he began marginalizing Ahmadinejad and directly challenging the 
president’s authority. Members of Parliament resumed calls for investigations into the 
Ahmadinejad administration, and some began advocating impeachment within six months of his 
second inauguration. Being too closely aligned with the president became a political liability 
almost immediately following his re-election. In place of what was Ahmadinejad’s considerable 
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international presence, other high level officials increasingly outlined state policy in the media. 
Supreme Leader Khamenei launched on official Twitter account, using social media to translate 
his statements and past speeches into several languages. 
This break between Ahmadinejad and those who supported his disputed re-election 
highlights the complex relationship the regime sees between itself and the people. It would seem 
that this rejection was due at least in part to the disapproval demonstrated by an easily mobilized 
portion of society, including students. Those in power were put there by similar protests, a reality 
they have not forgotten.  Rather than continue to prop up a president with ever falling domestic 
and international approval, leaders chose to distance themselves from an anchor that had 
tarnished all involved.  
Although Ahmadinejad was given the cold shoulder, the Supreme Leader and his hard-
line allies did not turn to the Reformists favorably. Instead, the once prominent opposition 
group was largely forced from office unless willing to support hardline elements. Reformist 
newspapers were shut down, activists were arrested or exiled, and a general sense of oppression 
dominated the political atmosphere. This continued crackdown led US State Department 
officials to call Iran a “police state”116 in late 2009.  
Following the protests of 2009 and the subsequent infighting the outlook for Iranian 
political society looked grim. When Parliamentary elections took place in 2012, it was initially 
unclear how the process would playout. Many leaders called for a boycott in response to the still 
open wounds of the 2009 unrest. Many Reformists had been forced from power, and those who 
hadn’t were in the precarious position of choosing cooperation and some governmental 
participation or activism and loss of what little power they had maintained. Some Reformist 
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leaders advocated boycotts of the elections, citing the continued house arrest of Mir Hossein 
Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Others, including former President Khatami, cast votes and as 
such were derided as having abandoned the Green Movement.  
The division of the Reformist camp on what method impacts the most change has been an 
ongoing struggle. President Khatami champions working within the system to create reform, 
while others favor protest and non-compliance. Until the presidential election 2013, many felt 
the reform era had ended when Khatami left office, a sentiment sharpened by the 2009 election 
crackdown. What was missed in the interim between the 2009 and 2013 elections, however, was 
the division developing among hard-line factions. As economic pressure mounted, cracks in the 
conservative response began showing, which would eventually pave the way for a surprise 
victory in the 2013 presidential election. 
The parliamentary elections took place peacefully and with no large-scale public 
demonstrations. The state released voter turnout numbers of around 66%117, in line with average 
parliamentary election turnout though lower than presidential elections. The breakdown of seats 
was predictable, with almost 60% going to hard-line candidates. 35%, the second largest 
coalition, was Reformist, while the remaining seats went to mandated religious minority 
representatives and independent candidates.118 The result suggested a consolidation of power by 
the hard-line elements of the government and the continued forcing out of Reformists, although 
the part boycott played in the election is difficult to assess. 
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As factions fought for control in the wake of national unrest, the central power in Iran 
was not untouched by the scandal. The official title for the office we call the Supreme Leader is 
Rahbar, a Farsi word that does not translate directly to English. A closer translation, according to 
Hooman Majd, would be “guide” rather than “leader.” Within the original framework Ayatollah 
Khomeini had designed through his writings on the role of Islam in government, the role of the 
Supreme Leader was envisioned as a religious voice to temper policies. It was this detached idea 
of the Supreme Leader, acting as a guide in public and pulling strings behind closed doors, that 
allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to maintain his approval ratings and stay well above political 
fighting. This is not something Ayatollah Khamenei has been able to do as adeptly, and as such 
as changed the way the public relates to the Supreme Leader. 
 Whereas Khomeini stayed well away from public fighting, Khamenei waded directly into 
the thick of it during the controversial 2009 presidential election. By allying himself closely with 
Ahmadinejad and speaking out publicly against protests, he made himself a target for unrest in a 
way Khomeini had carefully avoided. Khamenei’s consolidation of power proved to be a double 
edged sword as responsibility fell solely on his shoulders. According to the United States 
Institute of Peace, 
 
[Khamenei] has destroyed Iranian political institutions that might 
restrain him but that also could protect him by sharing 
responsibility for decisions. So when Khamenei weakens 
institutions, he alone then faces responsibility for every 
government action. This makes him vulnerable.119 
 
Before 2009, presidents had taken the brunt of public unrest for unpopular policies, such 
as Khatami’s low approval ratings on leaving office due to his inability to secure reforms from 
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the more hardline elements in the government. During the 2009 protests, many protesters 
addressed the Supreme Leader directly, sending their ire to an office once thought of as off 
limits. 
 In the aftermath of 2009, the Supreme Leader was unable to rely upon Ahmadinejad as he 
previous had, and as a result took a far more public role. Although other officials were also more 
active, the sudden frequency of policy statements coming from the Supreme Leader was 
unprecedented given the secrecy of his office. This signified the major shift taking place, as the 
Supreme Leader pulled away from simply acting as a behind-the-scenes actor and becoming a 
political entity in and of himself. It is notable that since the inauguration of President Rouhani, 
Khamenei has slipped into the background, letting high ranking official speak on policy while he 
throws vague support behind various factions. Among the topics currently on the top of the 
Supreme Leader’s social media agenda are book recommendations, something his office has 
taken to tweeting following a Foreign Affairs profile citing his admiration for literature. 
 
 The final four years of Ahmadinejad’s tenure proved extremely challenging for 
leadership. The international community continuously questioned the legitimacy of the Iranian 
government, while layering more and more sanctions on the country. Domestically, surveillance 
and crackdowns on journalists, activists, and students as well as the dismissal of professors led 
many to feel the Iranian government may be replaced by a popular uprising, as was occurring in 
places like Libya and Egypt. By the time the presidential campaigning began for the 2013 
elections, inflation in Iran rose to 45%120 and the middle class began feeling the effects as basic 
goods skyrocketed in cost. Iran was also removed from the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, crippling international transactions. USIP reported that 
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“SWIFT's annual report notes that 19 Iranian banks and 25 Iranian institutions use SWIFT, and 
that in 2010 they "sent 1,160,000 messages and received 1,105,000 messages."”121  
Foreign currency reserves continue to dwindle, having “dropped from $100 billion in 
2011 to $80 billion by July 2013... Only $20 billion of that is fully accessible,”122 according to 
the Christian Science Monitor. Sanctions on the oil industry caused the loss of half the 
government’s oil revenue, which makes up 80% of total incoming funds.123 Shortages in 
medicine have caused preventable death124, resulting in the restructuring of certain sanctions.125 
Although Ahmadinejad was unable to run for a third term, the question of whether his successor 
would continue on the path of resistance and rhetoric made the outlook for Iran grim. 
 
2013 Election  
 Iranian elections, though widely watched and reported upon, are little understood in the 
US. The primary players in any given election cycle are often officials without international 
standing, holding offices that may not have entirely clear purposes. Candidates for election must 
declare their intention to run, register with the Guardian Council, and make it through a vetting 
process that eliminates a vast majority of names put forward. The result is a complicated pool of 
candidates that changes almost daily as candidates voluntarily leave the race or are dropped by 
the Guardian Council. Alliances and endorsements are important in Iranian politics, more so than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121  Khalaji. "Assessing Iran's Parliamentary Elections."  
122  Ariel Zirulnick. Christian Science Monitor, "Iran sanctions: How much are they really hurting." Last modified 
Oct 15, 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/1015/Iran-sanctions-How-much-are-they-really-
hurting. 
123  Thomas Erdbrink. New York Times, "Iran Staggers as Sanctions Hit Economy." Last modified Sept 30, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/world/middleeast/iran-staggers-as-sanctions-hit-economy.html?_r=0. 
124  Saeed Kamali Dehghan. The Guardian, "Haemophilic Iranian boy 'dies after sanctions disrupt medicine 
supplies'." Last modified Nov 14, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/14/sanctions-stop-medicines-
reaching-sick-iranians. 
125 BBC, "US opens more exports of medical equipment to Iran." Last modified July 25, 2013. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23453844. 
 	   86	  
	  
political parties. The potential of a well formed alliance and endorsement network can be seen in 
the 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani, who was able to win in the first round of voting after 
endorsements from leading Reformist and Moderate politicians and alliances that led to his being 
the only reform-minded candidate on the ballot. At few times are the dynamics of Iranian politics 
on display more clearly than during the brief, whirlwind presidential election cycle. 
 In 2009, the media was quickly caught up in the fervor surrounding the Mousavi 
campaign, drawing comparisons between the charismatic establishment insider turned Reformist 
icon overnight and President Barack Obama. In 2013, however, pundits seemed to expect the 
worst during the runup to elections. This pessimism was not without reason; as the election got 
closer, crackdowns on journalists and activists seen as potential unrest agents began with more 
frequency. Many Iranians were considering a boycott of the election, unwilling to participate in 
what they characterized as little more than a game played by the elites for their own gain. The 
widespread disillusionment of voters prompted a rare candid pronouncement from the Supreme 
Leader, who encouraged even those who do not believe in or support the Islamic Republic to 
vote for the sake of the country.  
 In the US, the candidacy of Saeed Jalili received a considerable share of media coverage. 
The then nuclear negotiator and former Revolutionary Guards member was cast as the most 
likely successor to Ahmadinejad, due in large part to the bellicosity of his campaign. Jalili came 
to represent the path Iran seemed to be on, pushing themselves further into isolation and the 
regime further from the people. Close to the Supreme Leader, outspokenly pious, and showing 
no inclination to compromise with the West, Jalili was an extreme in a race dominated by 
Principlists. Following the disqualification of Rafsanjani, who was seen as the most formidable 
Moderate candidate to declare his candidacy, the path seemed clear for Jalili’s victory. He was 
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supported by a number of conservative officials and clerical leaders, and many suggested he 
enjoyed the private backing of the Supreme Leader, seen as giving him the advantage early on in 
the official two-week campaign period.  
 One significant way in which the 2013 election differed from 2009 was the use of 
debates. In 2009, Iranian TV hosted the first debate between presidential candidates, although 
only Mousavi and Ahmadinejad were asked to participate. In 2013 all candidates participated in 
three debates, discussing national security, the economy, and other policy issues. Never before 
have candidates been put in a position to articulate and defend their positions in front of the 
Iranian people in this format, and it became clear early on that some knew better than others how 
to use it to their advantage. Among the first to struggle when put on the spot regarding the 
economy was Saeed Jalili, who was unable to offer concrete policy proposals to combat rampant 
inflation and unemployment. As the debates went on, including both questions from a moderator 
and questions shared between candidates, Jalili clung increasingly to slogans and revolutionary 
rhetoric, putting him at odds with most candidates focusing on clear policy ideas emphasising 
moderation to some degree. 
 Hassan Rouhani, a cleric and former member of the Khatami administration, quickly but 
quietly surrounded himself with a cadre of Reformist leaders and officials. He was able to reach 
an agreement with the two other Moderate-Reformist candidates in which they left the race and 
supported his candidacy, a move that undoubtedly led to his outright win. In interviews, he 
stressed moderation and distanced himself from those less willing to negotiate with the West. 
Rouhani ran on a platform of change and hope, similar to the platform of Mir Hossein Mousavi 
in 2009. He spoke out against hardline rhetoric that has effectively isolated Iran steadily since 
2005 and discussed unemployment, particularly among educated women. Easing restrictions on 
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freedom of speech and expression was a prominent theme in his campaign, as was the 
importance of eschewing international concern regarding the disputed Iranian nuclear program. 
The memory of 2009 and the Mousavi campaign was invoked often, including the slogan, “A 
vote for Purple [official color of Rouhani campaign] paves the way for Green.” Rouhani also 
advocated the release of political prisoners, including Mousavi, Karroubi, and their wives, a 
commonly repeated campaign promise that the Supreme Leader has not as of yet publically 
denied. 
Prior to the opening of polls on June 14, many had begun decrying the election as little 
more than an attempt by the theocratic regime to reclaim some level of legitimacy. The question 
wasn’t would the election be stolen again, but how would it be stolen and to whom would it be 
handed. At the very least, the election would show the insecurity of a regime still shaken by 
protests following the last presidential election, as they clambered to hold on to their waning 
claim to legitimate authority. As voting got underway many were watching closely for signs of 
irregularities or intimidation at the polls. But no such problems were reported, and later in the 
day voter turnout increased substantially, leading to the extension of voting hours in areas where 
long lines were forming.  
Late into the night and over the next day, the Ministry of Interior reported polling results 
on state TV as the numbers were verified, allowing the public to monitor results as they came in 
rather than piecing it together after the fact. It became clear early on that Rouhani held a wide 
lead, with the five conservative candidates trailing far behind. That lead held, and as the day 
went on many began wondering if the Reform candidate would be able to win outright, a feat 
that would require more than 50% of the vote in the first round. Candidates had promised prior to 
the election not to make an official statement regarding the election results prior to the Ministry 
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announcement naming the president-elect, a move likely intended to encourage the resolution of 
any issues behind closed doors rather than by mobilizing supporters in the streets as Mousavi and 
Karroubi did in 2009.  
 When crowds gathered in the streets on June 15 following the announcement of Hassan 
Rouhani’s victory, they were celebratory. Twitter was once again glued to Iran, this time filled 
with pictures of fireworks and dancing. The iconic image of the 2013 election became a laughing 
young woman spraying her friends with what appears to be shaving cream, a stark visual given 
the images of bloodshed following the 2009 election  No irregularities were reported from 
polling places, no security forces were dispatched, and no one challenged the election results. 
Remarkably, it would seem the regime sought legitimacy in the only way that could help the 
image of Iran not only domestically, but internationally. The election was allowed to proceed 
with no signs of interference, a decision that undoubtedly led to the spike in voter turnout as the 
day progressed. The government called on the people to participate in the election and allowed 
them to do so, a choice that seemed revolutionary in light of the 2009 unrest.  
 Although the protests and subsequent crackdown that occurred in 2009 loomed large over 
the 2013 election, it was not ignored by officials. The Supreme Leader himself has 
acknowledged the events of the previous election, taking to Twitter to acknowledge that in 2009 
there was the “same excitement, but with insults.” This kind of acknowledgement has continued, 
with Khamenei tweeting multiple times about 2009 in a way that falls short of condemning 
protesters. Some leaders have spoken out in support of protest, including President Rouhani, 
calling demonstrations “natural and popular.”126 Although this vague way of addressing such a 
monumental event in recent history may seem disingenuous, the fact that 2009 is being discussed 
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by elites is an indication that Iranian leadership understands the weight of the unrest and the 
importance of addressing it. As of yet the primary action taken in regards to the 2009 unrest has 
been the release of numerous people arrested in the wake of protests, although Mousavi and 
Karroubi remain under house arrest.  
 
Rouhani’s Use of Social Media 
 In the 2013 election, social media usage changed dramatically for Iranian officials. 
Although Twitter and Facebook are ostensibly banned in the country, and particularly censored 
following the use of such sites in organizing protests in 2009, presidential candidates and 
government officials began using social media to articulate state policy, platforms, and make 
statements on current affairs. The Supreme Leader’s office takes to Twitter to translate various 
past statements and links to recent speeches, while other officials tweet in both Farsi and 
English. 
 Hassan Rouhani used Twitter regularly leading up to the election, live-tweeting debates 
and using hashtags like #prudence and #moderation to simply explain his policy stances. This 
heavy use of Twitter has continued into his presidency, with both  Farsi and English accounts run 
by volunteers. In a recent surprise, the president used the platform to wish the global Jewish 
community a “blessed Rosh Hashanah”. In light of recent chemical weapons allegations rising in 
Syria, he also used Twitter to condemn the use of chemical weapons, although he comes short of 
pointing the blame at Bashar al-Assad, and discussing Iran’s own experience as a victim of 
chemical weapons attacks carried out by Saddam Hussein. 
 Another official who has begun using Twitter is Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who also 
has a very active Facebook page. Zarif personally tweets and posts to Facebook, unlike Rouhani, 
and responds personally to some critics, such as Christine Pelosi, daughter of Nancy Pelosi, in a 
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recent exchange following his own Rosh Hashanah greeting. While he uses Twitter for brief 
exchanges, either en masse or with specific users, Facebook has become a platform through 
which he can articulate his views on things like chemical weapons usage in Syria and the 
international debate surrounding possible punitive strikes. He also used Facebook to post a day-
to-day journal of his meetings and impressions at the United Nations General Assembly in 
October, giving an interesting behind-the-scenes look at ongoing diplomatic efforts. 
 This use of social media is unique in that it has changed the dynamic between not only 
Iranian citizens and their leaders, who are now in a position to hear individual opinions and, in 
some cases, respond on a person to person basis, but also between Iran and the international 
community. Through this informal medium, Iran’s Foreign Minister is able to directly 
communicate with Americans regarding Iran’s nuclear program and the Supreme Leader can 
communicate in English without the use of the Western press, something he has actively avoided 
doing his entire career. This person to person dialogue has given average citizens in the West a 
window into one of the most secretive governments in the world. It has also laid bare the 
divisions that exist in the ruling elite, including the rapid spread of video and audio of Rafsanjani 
condemning the chemical weapons use of Bashar al-Assad, which was quickly denied by Iranian 
















Part III: Looking Forward 
 
 
Only time will tell what President Rouhani is able to accomplish while in office. Despite 
his liberalizing proposals, the Parliament and Supreme Leader still hold more sway than the 
President in making state policy. Early indications suggest many members of the establishment 
have felt the pressure of sanctions and public unrest for the past four years, and are interested in 
ways to alleviate the strain being put on the regime. The Supreme Leader himself has advocated 
what he calls “heroic flexibility”, signaling willingness to compromise. 
 
We are not against proper and rational diplomatic moves, be it in 
the diplomatic sphere, or the sphere of domestic politics...Your 
servant believes in what was coined years ago: 'heroic flexibility.' 
Flexibility is necessary on certain occasions. It is very 
beneficial.127 
 
Rouhani is in an interesting position, gaining legitimacy not only from his clerical 
standing but also from his direct experience in the upper echelons of governance. As the personal 
representative of the Supreme Leader on the Supreme National Security Council Rouhani spoke 
with the Supreme Leader’s voice on matters of state security, giving him a perspective on 
Khamenei’s calculations to which very few have access. He served as the chief nuclear 
negotiator under President Khatami, an experience that will be invaluable in navigating P5+1 
talks. 
Rouhani’s presidency has at the time of writing got off to an incredible start, making 
diplomatic strides unthinkable even six months ago. Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif have 
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reached out to the Jewish community with Rosh Hashanah blessings via Twitter, and Zarif later 
backed up the comments stating, “Jews are not the enemy of Iran.” This kind of goodwill gesture 
was unheard of under Ahmadinejad, and faced some criticism in Iran. But the leaders stood by 
their statements, and Rouhani was accompanied by the only Jewish Parliament member on his 
first United Nations visit in September.  
 Holocaust denial, long a boon in Iranian relations, is no longer part of Iranian rhetoric. 
The President and Foreign Minister have both sought to clear up concerns by condemning the 
“genocide carried out by the Nazis against the Jews”, although they have maintained the state 
policy of rejecting the use of the Holocaust as a pretense for the occupation of Palestine. More 
recently, Zarif told ABC’s This Week that any statements indicating the denial of the Holocaust 
on the Supreme Leader’s website is a mistranslation, and that the genocide is not “a myth”.128 
Although all statements regarding Israel are framed through the occupation of Palestine, this kind 
of tamed rhetoric has been a welcome change.  
 Rouhani and Zarif have also launched an incredible PR offensive, which is already 
changing the way diplomacy with Iran is framed. Reaching out to the international community 
has resulted in letters exchanged between Presidents Obama and Rouhani, meetings with foreign 
ministers from countries like Britain, op-eds run in US and UK newspapers, and the kind of 
positive interactions unseen since the days of Khatami. The nuclear issue is at the top of 
everyone’s concerns, and following preliminary discussions with EU Foreign Minister Catherine 
Ashton and letters between Obama and Rouhani, negotiations resumed with the P5+1 in October. 
The recently secured interim agreement resulting from these negotiations has been hailed as a 
victory of Rouhani and Zarif over hardline elements in the government, capping the first one 
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hundred days in office with much needed sanctions relief and the fulfillment of a key campaign 
promise. 
 One of the most significant and unexpected breakthroughs came at the tail end of 
President Rouhani’s trip to the United Nations. The trip to New York, where Rouhani gave his 
first UN speech, was a whirlwind of speaking events, interviews, and meetings with heads of 
state. On his way to the airport to leave, he and President Obama had a fifteen minute phone call, 
the first official contact between Iranian and US top leadership since 1978. The conversation 
reportedly reiterated their shared commitment to resolving the issues standing between Iran and 
the United States, and ended with the presidents exchanging a farewell in each other’s first 
languages. Supreme Leader Khamenei commented positively on the trip. lending the phone call 
and meetings with various heads of state credibility, saying, “We support the diplomatic 
approach of the government and consider diplomatic efforts as important and support what 
happened in the latest trip.”129 
 Rouhani is not the first president to come into office facing daunting challenges. Just as 
Rouhani has now taken ownership of the worst inflation Iran has suffered since the 1980s and a 
seemingly unresolvable nuclear crisis, Rafsanjani came into the presidency with a mandate to 
end the crippling Iran-Iraq War and rebuild the economy. At that time, Rafsanjani was granted 
unprecedented independence in policy, allowing him to negotiate a ceasefire, reform economic 
policy, and rekindle lost trade ties around the world. He also stood to take the fall should his 
initiatives backfire, allowing the Supreme Leader to turn his loyalties as needed to maintain 
public approval.  
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It may be that Rouhani, who has already been far more active in the public sphere than 
Ahmadinejad was during his second term as the Supreme Leader backs away from the spotlight, 
is in a similar situation. The central issue facing the Iranian economy is the effect of sanctions, 
which have resulted in Iran’s being named the country with the world’s highest inflation rate.130 
Although the deal reached at Geneva is a key first step, a long, difficult road still lies ahead for 
those negotiating a comprehensive solution. In order to have sanctions fully lifted, the nuclear 
issue must be dealt with in a way that allows Iran to maintain face while compromising with the 
West, which has proven difficult task in recent years.  
 If this is the case, and Rouhani is as empowered to resolve the crises facing Iran as he 
seems, the window is not open indefinitely. Already hard-line factions are pushing back against 
the president’s diplomatic efforts, through the media and use of propaganda against the United 
States. Rouhani and his team have provided gains from negotiations with the P5+1 and direct 
contact with the US, which has gone far in validating their approach. Now the agreement must be 
adhered to on all sides, lest those gains are lost and hardliners are able to once again assert their 
resistance-based approach. Given the Supreme Leader’s belief that “Western governments, led 
by Washington, wish to overthrow the Islamic Republic and destroy the Islamic revolution, just 
as they did to the Soviet Union”131 the onus to prove relations with the West pay concrete 
dividends is on Rouhani. 
Nuclear policy is clearly a top priority for the administration, as Rouhani began 
reworking the manner in which negotiations are conducted only one month into his first term. It 
has been announced that the negotiations will be under the control of the Foreign Ministry rather 
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than the National Security Council, signalling a shift in strategy. The Foreign Minister, Javad 
Zarif, will be heading the talks himself, having previously served in the same post before being 
dismissed by Ahmadinejad. Zarif is well thought of in diplomatic circles, studied at the 
University of Denver, and speaks fluent English. His nomination was noted in the international 
media as a possible “peace-offering” to the West and a signalling that the government was ready 
for effective negotiations.  
 
Reforming Iran’s Foreign Policy 
 In many ways, the election of Hassan Rouhani has provided the first viable opportunity 
for Iran to shed the revolutionary identity leaders adopted in 1979 in favor of a normalized 
position in world affairs. That normalization will rely on several factors, the most prominent of 
which is the nuclear issue. With the first steps taken on the journey to resolve outstanding 
concerns of possible weaponization, other outstanding issues cannot be forgotten. Although 
relations deteriorated after the outset of the Syrian civil war, support for Hamas has been a 
sticking point between Iran and the West, where Hamas has long been considered a terrorist 
group. Iran also helped create and continues to support Hezbollah, a powerful Lebanese political 
party and militant organization also classified as a terrorist group. Iran has been seen as a 
primary threat to Israel due to the ongoing conflicts waged intermittently with Hezbollah in the 
north and the southern Hamas controlled Gaza Strip. 
 Iran has also been allegedly involved in sowing unrest in other regional states, funneling 
money and in some cases arms to Shiite populations in Sunni ruled countries. This involvement 
has ranged from supporting Afghani North Alliance against the Taliban to fomenting sectarian 
unrest in Iraq to alleged support for Bahraini “Arab Spring” protests. While Iran boasts of not 
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invading a country in 500 years, many see the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 
sovereign nations as a blatant violation of international law. For Iran, these activities provide 
much desired regional influence, but also undermines Iran’s efforts to be taken seriously as an 
international player. It is a difficult to overcome cycle, wherein the source of Iran’s influence is 
also what deprives the country of international normalization, which furthers Iran’s need for 
sources of influence outside official channels.  
It is possible to break the cycle, however, but negotiations are unlikely to yield results on 
this matter. Only through demonstrated ability to co-exist without overt or covert aggression will 
these avenues Iran has carved out for itself become unnecessary as a place at the table is created. 
While President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif have met with regional leaders and 
advocated rebuilding relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, longstanding mistrust of Iran’s 
intentions must be overcome. On the same note, Iranians must be assured of their own security, 
particularly in a region dotted with US military bases. Given recent US military forays into Iraq 
and Afghanistan and open calls for military action by US and Israeli figures, as well as the 
growing number of drone strikes in the region, Iranian wariness of US ally intentions is equally 
valid. 
Resolving concerns over the nuclear program is an important part of rebuilding Iran’s 
international image, although continued harsh rhetoric between Iranian leaders and Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggests that even a mild thaw between the two regional powers is 
far off. Iran has been a vocal supporter of Palestinian sovereignty, as have many regional powers. 
Iranian leaders have often stated they will support any peace agreement reached between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority, a policy stance that has yet to be tested as talks on an agreement 
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continue to end in stalemate. The Palestinian issue has become the central sticking point, 
although certainly not the only one, considering Iranian support for groups like Hamas.  
Iranian and Israeli rhetoric has led many to believe war between the two is imminent. 
Israel has called on the US and Western allies to carry out pre-emptive strikes on Iranian nuclear 
sites, threats Iran has responded to by vowing retaliation. Israel has also been tied to the 
Mujihadeen e-Khalq, which has carried out terrorist activities within Iran since the 1980s. 
Iranian officials have been embroiled in numerous controversies after translated statements 
appearing to call for the physical destruction of Israel come to light. While officials have stated 
that they favor a referendum of all residents, including Palestinians, to determine the future of 
Israel, the perception of Iran as militarily aggressive towards Israel is one that hangs heavy over 
international public opinion.  
The mutually antagonistic relationship between Iran and Israel, though to a point softened 
due to the Iran-United States thaw diminishing the likelihood of a military strike against Iran, 
will likely remain in place regardless of internal political shifts. Opportunity for a change would 
be brought about by a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and short of that no 
imaginable incident could create a mutual opportunity to demonstrate a lack of ill will. The role 
Iran has in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of a complex, interwoven mass of international 




Domestically, significant steps have been taken to move forward with Rouhani’s 
campaign promises. At time of writing, support for Rouhani seems strong across political lines 
and with the Supreme Leader, something the new president seeks to capitalize on by 
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implementing numerous policies as quickly as possible. Although he currently has support, 
should nuclear negotiations go poorly or economic growth remain elusive, it is likely he will be 
stripped of his current independence and made to adhere to a more conservative agenda by the 
Supreme Leader. 
 Among the president’s domestic agenda are several initiatives that could reverse the strict 
censorship put in place under Ahmadinejad. With a number of his administration avid users of 
social media, it has been asked repeatedly if bans on sites like Twitter and Facebook will be 
lifted. Rouhani has consistently repeated his hope to give Iranians access to all global 
information, and as such the ban on Facebook is being reviewed to determine in what 
circumstances and with what qualifications access to the site could be restored. Rouhani also 
reopened the Tehran Cinema House, a theater closed by Ahmadinejad, and the arts community 
has seen a resurgence.  
 Recently, Rouhani has spoken out against moral police persons serving as the primary 
arbiters of modesty in regards to dress. In speeches, the president has stated that these types of 
positions should be a last resort and discussed contributors to “immodest behavior” such as 
poverty and continued economic hardship.132 Soon after his election, Rouhani publically 
questioned the validity of dress codes as a guide for and barometer of societal modesty. Although 
as it stands women are required to wear hijab as discussed earlier, this kind of public questioning 
of the requirement could indicate a debate going on in clerical and political circles. 
 Freedom of expression has been key to Rouhani’s public agenda. His campaign platform 
and subsequent statements indicate that he hopes to pursue a relaxing of restrictions on students, 
professors, opposition figures, and the press. He has responded to and encouraged criticism of 
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his government, taking to Twitter to thank students who provided critical assessments of his 
policies. Since Rouhani took office, numerous political prisoners have been released, including 
internationally known opposition figures and activists. The question of Mousavi and Karroubi’s 
house arrest remains unresolved, but the issue is currently being reviewed by the Supreme 
National Security Council and some have suggested the Reformist leaders could be released in 
the future. 
 It is still entirely possible efforts by Rouhani’s administration could fail. Having taken 
office less than six months prior to writing, there is a distinct chance that what seems promising 
could hit unexpected snags. But in the event Rouhani is only able to secure token reform or hard-
liners are able to regain substantial control, the election of a moderate minded candidate reflects 
a level of pragmatism for which Iran is often not given credit. Rouhani’s election and subsequent 
initiatives refute the idea of the Iranian clerical establishment being monolithic and Iranian 
leadership being universally hostile. After eight years of harsh rhetoric from a non-cleric hard-
line president, the return of pragmatism and conciliatory tone brought about by a well established 
religious leader is striking. Rouhani was the only cleric in the pool of candidates in 2013, yet he 
was not the closest ally of the Supreme Leader. It suggests that even under a theocratic system, 
democracy can be brought about within Iran through elections and gradual reform. 
 
Former President Ahmadinejad 
 
 As Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure as president has passed, some have asked what will 
become of the once outspoken, ubiquitous figure. Immediately following his leaving office, it 
was announced that he would sit on the influential Expediency Council, the task of which is 
largely to resolve disputes between the Majles and the Guardian Council. The Expediency 
Council is chaired by Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the Ahmadinejad’s most powerful detractors, 
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and the effectiveness of having someone so at odds with the ruling elite on the council has been 
questioned in the international media. It is not uncommon for high ranking officials to enter the 
shadowy behind-the-curtains bodies pulling important strings in domestic politics, but few if any 
have left office with as heavy a cloud hanging over them. The former president will also be 
returning to his former position at the University of Tehran, where he taught engineering prior to 
being named mayor of Tehran. 
 Ahmadinejad left office with very little influence and an extremely low reputation among 
both leaders and citizens. Due to this, his seat on the Expediency Council surprised many 
watching Iran. But his position in the country is far from secure, particularly in light of the 
almost personal crusade against him led by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani since 
Ahmadinejad assumed office in 2005. Larijani has been one of his most outspoken critics, 
blocking policy and nominations when possible, calling for Ahmadinejad’s impeachment or 
questioning his administration often. In July, Larijani announced unspecified charges being 
brought against Ahmadinejad, for which he will potentially stand trial. Members of his inner 
circle have been called in on charges of corruption in recent years, although it appears court 
cases brought against him will focus on bureaucratic missteps and spreading of false information, 
according to a recent report by Tehran Bureau.133 
 
Changes on the horizon 
 
 The greatest change coming for Iran will be the selection of Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
successor. At this time, there has been no outward indication of who the next Supreme Leader 
may be or how the choice will be made. Ayatollah Khamenei’s health has been called into 
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question a number of times, and in the past long absences from public have required him to 
appear on television to prove he had not passed away.134 As the years pass, the likelihood of a 
new Supreme Leader increases exponentially, leaving the future direction of official state policy 
unclear. 
As the final arbiter of Iranian affairs, the office of the Supreme Leader is the most crucial 
to understanding where policy is headed. Although continuity of ideology seems a sure bet, the 
makeup of the governmental elite makes the decision far from clear. In the past, Hashemi 
Rafsanjani was proven critical in making decisions with the Assembly of Experts, a 
constitutionally mandated body responsible for electing the Supreme Leader. This group is also 
able to dismiss the Supreme Leader from office, should his performance be found unsuitable. In 
the election of Khamenei, it was Rafsanjani who assisted in elevating the then Hojatoleslam to 
the rank of Grand Ayatollah, required for assumption of office. This critical role earned him the 
reputation of “King maker”, as well as his being regarded as the second most powerful man in 
the country. Rafsanjani, although not as formidable as he once was, remains a key part of the 
religious and political elite, and his loyalties lie with the Pragmatists. It is possible that the 
Assembly of Experts could choose a center or center-left candidate for the most important post in 
the country, particularly if the moderate policies of Hassan Rouhani prove fruitful. Given the 
struggles of Iran over the past decade, hardline revolutionaries unwilling to compromise in order 
to integrate in the international system may well find themselves at a loss.   
 
 Another key change facing Iran today and in coming years is the changing demographics 
of the nation. From the time of the Islamic Revolution until today, power has been held by a 
small group of clerics, all of whom had been responsible for bringing about the revolution and 
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building an Islamic government. Today, however, a majority of the country’s population is under 
the age of 30.135 This means that a great number of people have lived only under the Islamic 
Republic, with no first hand experiences with the government of the Shah. In many cases, they 
were either not yet born or too young to remember the Iran-Iraq War, the seminal event 
informing Iran’s security calculation since the 1980s. These Iranians were growing up during the 
1990s, when Reformist policies were allowing the economy to grow and society to push against 
rigid restrictions on things like clothing and access to foreign entertainment. They also came of 
age in a very different period of Iranian history from what they experienced growing up, due to 
President Ahmadinejad’s harmful rhetoric and ever increasing sanctions. Just as Americans 
coming into adulthood following the Recession feel they have lost out on what was once a 
promised opportunity, so Iranians feel they should have the economic opportunities and 
international integration the country enjoyed under Rafsanjani and Khatami.  
 As these Iranians assume more positions of power, replacing those who have long 
maintained a vision of Iran as a revolutionary state, Iran may evolve more quickly into a stable 
democracy. For those coming of age now, Iran as an Islamic state is all they have known and the 
framework from which they can progress, not a revolution they must maintain. Young people in 
Iran are among the most educated in the region, tuned in to international news and media, and 
pushing cultural envelopes, suggesting the future of Iran will continue building on gains made in 
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    Conclusion: Democracy in Iran 
  
 
 The sum of all these parts is an ongoing political evolution. What began as public protests 
calling for a constitution in 1905 has transitioned and transformed over the past 110 years to 
bring Iran to the current system. Although the Islamic Republic is often treated as the end of 
history for Iran, a tragic misstep that cannot fully be recovered from without a complete 
reworking of the government, it is the outcome of a history that blends foreign intervention, 
clerical authority, and an ongoing debate on the value of Westernization. By dismissing the 
Islamic Republic as the antithesis to democracy rather than another phase on a long road to 
democracy ignores those working diligently to create an alternative yet equal model to Western 
style governance.  
 International rhetoric regarding democracy in Iran tends to look backward, focusing on 
the US overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh as the end of any hope for democracy or 
glorification of the shah’s Iran in comparison to the Islamic Republic today. These approaches 
not only simplify Iranian politics, but the hard road to democracy for any country. Those who 
fought for a strong parliament in 1906, or demonstrated in the streets in 1979, or continue to 
push back against oppressive policy today are forgotten when commentators lament the 
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hopelessness of democracy in Iran. There is no time limit or a finite number of attempts to reach 
full democracy, even in Iran. 
 Democracy is, by its continuously evolving and constantly changing nature, forward 
looking. Iran has a long history of oppression, torture, and myriad human rights violations. It is a 
history that, someday, leaders will have to answer for. But past transgressions do not preclude 
future reform. In the near future, the Islamic Republic will face changes both inevitable and with 
great potential to change the political system. The coming power shift as revolutionary leaders 
are replaced by the next generation of elites and Supreme Leader Khamenei passes away will 
provide an opportunity to rethink policy and what it takes for the system to survive, resulting in 
changes. Reza Marashi explains these changes could be “perhaps short of the regime change that 
some outside Iran prefer, but far from negligible to the millions of Iranians living inside the 
country who know they deserve better than the status quo.”136  
 
While resolving lingering concerns over Iran’s regional intentions are important, these 
issues do not preclude domestic reform. Iranian leadership has been engaged in democratization 
for over a century, and while there is still much work to be done, the foundation established since 
1900 has the strength necessary to build upon. Iranians are educated and politically engaged, 
have access to medical care, and benefit from an established welfare system that provides the 
most vulnerable segments of society with necessary services. The country has reliable 
infrastructure and industry, with valuable natural resources and the stability needed to capitalize 
on extraction.  
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After a century of struggle, over the course of which first Persia and later Iran completely 
overhauled the monarchical system of government in favor of popular representation and 
constitutional rule, today those who once stood against the oppression of the shah have become 
the obstacle to the full realization of democracy. Remaining revolutionary elements and the 
insecurity felt as an international pariah has led to violent crackdowns, direct interference in the 
press and education, and lingering doubts over Iran’s ability to fully embrace their own stated 
republican values.  
Iranian leadership, however, has a demonstrated ability to redirect when the survival of 
the regime is in question. The 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani is a key example of this 
pragmatism. Just four years after massive unrest, the candidate considered the least likely to be 
allowed to win did just that in the first round of voting. Suzanne Maloney, of the Brookings 
Institute, pointed out after the elections that the primary obstacle facing Iran is the revolution not 
moderating after time in power, but that perhaps the heated campaign period and landslide 
election of a moderate signaled a shift in state policy.137  
Living up to espoused values is a struggle for numerous countries, including those 
established as stable democracies. For the Islamic Republic of Iran to survive and thrive, serious 
efforts must be made by those within the system that favor reform. To that end President Hassan 
Rouhani introduced his Civil Rights Charter, an English translation of which is currently 
unavailable. But Iran does not lack words and promises of equality and freedom. To move past 
the current stalemate between progress and those who would hold Iran back, the promises 
already made must be acted upon. 
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Concrete actions must be taken before the victory for moderation Rouhani’s election has 
been heralded as can truly be considered manifest. While small successes may seem 
inconsequential, like the opening of the Tehran Cinema House or banning of forced early 
retirement for politically active professors, these steps are important to building a political 
system where fewer loopholes allow for oppression. The capacity Rouhani has for implementing 
more systematic reforms, designed to increase women’s access to the workforce or increasing 
transparency in the penal system, will depend on the successes he attains in other areas and as 
such has yet to be seen. 
The building of democracy is a constant effort, within which shades of gray exist at every 
stage. Democracy is an impossible ideal, with new challenges presented at each turn. If one were 
to require perfect adherence to democratic principles, surely no state would live up to the 
standard. Iran, with greater repression than some and greater freedoms than others, has long 
fought its own struggle for democracy, carrying a torch lit by protesters in 1905. True and full 
realization of republican democracy will only come to Iran by internal channels, without the 
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